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I. INTRODUCTION
ESPITE the law's promise of a remedy for every right, I the abil-
ity of aggrieved parties to access the courts, and the law, has
long been constrained as a practical matter.2 In recent years,
the pace of contraction has accelerated as Congress and the courts
have used a wide variety of techniques3 to limit judicial access across a
broad terrain of contexts.4 Similar developments may be seen in the
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or
Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 967 (1998); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 631-41 (1997).
3. These techniques include:
" Increasing the "amount in controversy" required for diversity jurisdiction. See,
e.g., The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205(a),
110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1997) (increasing the amount from $50,000 to $75,000, effec-
tive Jan. 17, 1997).
" Narrowing the definition of "standing" to bring legal actions. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (contracting "injury in fact" re-
quirement for environmental standing); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976) (adopting scienter requirement under Section 10(b) of the federal se-
curities law).
" Narrowing the ripeness necessary to bring legal actions. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry
Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (holding that environmentalists' chal-
lenge to deforestation plan not ripe for review because of possibility that plan
may be changed).
" Expanding sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(reversing prior law in holding that Congress may not subject state to suit in state
court without state's consent, even on a federal claim).
For criticisms, see Press Release, Ronald Weich, American Civil Liberties Union, Upset-
ting Checks and Balances: Congressional Hostility To Courts in Times of Crisis (Nov. 1,
2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9810&
c=111; Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001);
Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the Community from It-
self, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 618-31 (1986).
4. Access to justice for the poor has been limited by severe reductions in funding for
legal services. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, Introduction to LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
POOR: TIME FOR REFORM xxiii (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990) (stating that the Legal
Services Corporation budget was cut by a quarter during the Reagan Administration);
Anonymous, Legal Services Survives, Barely, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at A14 (noting that
in 1996 Congress succeeded in cutting LSC funding by 30% and placing restrictions on the
type of work legal aid lawyers could conduct).
Congress and the courts have also limited legal rights in death penalty cases. See The
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 104 (1996), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 &
Supp. 2003) (limiting, inter alia, the availability of successive appeals, stays of execution,




Ironically perhaps, the rise of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) movement in the last quarter of a century has also contributed to
this alienation from law and the courts. Mediation programs are common
conditions of proceeding to trial in both state and federal courthouses, 6
and an abundance of contractual programs employing a wide variety of
dispute resolution processes are steadily becoming fixtures in American
life.7
While the research tends to suggest that many such initiatives have a
salutary effect,8 resulting in better outcomes through more satisfying
processes,9 not all is well.' 0 When unilaterally imposed in consumer and
employment contracts of adhesion, arbitration has been quite controver-
sial, in large part because of its capacity to reduce, if not altogether elimi-
nate, access to the courts and to the law.'' After all, arbitration is an
informal process in which the rules of substantive and procedural law are
not necessarily applied 12 by arbitrators who may or may not have a legal
ing the "abuse of the writ" doctrine to bar successive habeas petitions); Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989) (limiting habeas review to new issues of law).
5. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001).
6. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETrLEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: A SOURCE300K FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS 9-10 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. Disv. RESOL. 79 (de-
tailing expansion of ADR in the federal government); Christine M. Carlson, ADR in the
States: Great Progress Has Been Made, But There is Still Much to Do, 7 Disi,. RESOL. MAG.
4 (Summer 2001.) (providing an overview of state court and administrative ADR pro-
grams); Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systemizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59
ALB. L. REV. 847 (1996).
8. See generally Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil
Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 641(2002) (assessing an Ohio court-connected mediation program and comparing it with other
empirical findings documenting positive effects of mediation); Jennifer Shack, Efficiency:
Mediation Can Bring Gains, but under What Conditions?, 9 DisP. RESOL. MAO. 11 (Winter
2003) (summarizing empirical research).
9. See, e.g., SUSAN KEILITZ ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A MULTI-STATE
ASSESSMENT OF DIVORCE MEDIATION AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSING (1992)(finding that mediation participants were more likely to find the process to be fair and to
be satisfied with their agreement than those in adjudication).
10. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideol-
ogy, 2002 J. Disi. RESOL. 81.
11. The commentary on mandatory arbitration is vast, especially on the issue of
predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment and consumer rights. Compare,
e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997) (supporting mandatory arbitration in the employment
rights context), with Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273(1999) (opposing same). For a critique of mandatory arbitration of consumer rights, see
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33.
12. See GABRIEL M. WILNER, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (rev.
ed. 1997) (hereinafter 1 DOMKE). For discussions of the trend toward formalization of arbi-
tration, and ADR in general, see Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as
Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
927 (2002) and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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background.13 Moreover, the arbitrator's decisions are final in that they
are not subject to substantive review by courts beyond procedural defects
such as arbitral bias or misconduct.' 4
This informality is a two-edged sword. Because arbitration permits
parties to resolve their disputes without the constraints of law, it has the
potential to be faster and less expensive than traditional litigation.15 It
also offers the possibility of better decision making, as arbitration awards
are generally made by persons whom the parties agree upon, often be-
cause of the arbitrator's sophistication in the subject matter of the dis-
pute. Moreover, unfettered by rules of evidence or procedure, arbitral
decisions can be based on whatever evidence the parties wish to put
before the arbitrator, including industry customs and practices and other
applicable but non-legal norms.
However, the absence of legal standards can translate into gross sub-
stantive and procedural injustices, particularly when there are severe
power imbalances between the parties, 16 and the absence of substantive
judicial review worsens the situation by making capricious awards essen-
tially uncorrectable. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that arbitra-
tors, unlike judges, have economic incentives with respect to their case
loads that can affect their judgment in individual cases, making them per-
haps more favorably disposed toward "repeat players" than "one-
shotters."17
Arbitration, in short, is a trade-off in which the parties agree to ex-
change the benefits and risks of dispute resolution under the formal law
for the benefits and risks of dispute resolution in a less formal setting. For
this reason, whether the parties have actually agreed to this trade-off-
the "arbitrability" of the dispute-is a question that is profoundly impor-
tant to the more fundamental question of whether the parties will have
access to the courts and to the law for purposes of resolving the merits of
their legal dispute. This question of agreements to arbitrate has prolifer-
ated an extraordinarily complex and nuanced patchwork of doctrine that
sometimes seems far removed from reality-the Serbonian bog of arbi-
13. 1 DOMKE, supra note 12, § 1.01-1.02; see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 n.18
(1974).
14. 1 DOMKE, supra note 12, § 35:01-35:04; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1999 & Supp. 2003)
(stating grounds for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act); REVISED UNIF. AR3I'I RA-
"ION Acr § 23 (2000) (stating grounds for vacatur under the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act).
15. For a thoughtful discussion of pros and cons of arbitration, see generally Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration Law, 63 IND. L.J. 425 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, 14 CAL. LAW. 53 (1994);
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting as unconscionable
an arbitration provision that limited remedies, depositions, and bound only the employee,
among other abuses).
17. See Garth, supra note 12, at 932-33. For judicial concern about the repeat player
problem, see Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting on behalf of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) and Morrison v. Circuit City





Moreover, just who makes the arbitrability decision is among the more
subtle and important issues lurking in the mist. 19 In this deeper region of
the bog, the terrain is particularly treacherous, for American law sets up
something of a shell game. On one hand, the relevant statute, the Federal
Arbitration Act, requires courts of law to determine if parties have
agreed to arbitrate a dispute under normal principles of contract law: a
bargained-for exchange and the absence of defenses to enforcement, such
as fraud and duress. 20 On the other hand, however, if the arbitration pro-
vision is included in a larger contract and the dispute is about the validity
of that larger contract-which is to say, most of the time-the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in 1967 that parties are presumed to have agreed to
arbitrate merely by entering into the larger contract, regardless of that
larger contract's enforceability. Under the so-called "separability doc-
trine" of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,2' the
arbitration provision is deemed at law to be a "separate" contract, under
what may be understood as a theory of implied consent to arbitration. As
18. This phrase has a rich pedigree. Greek historian Herodotus described a Lake
Serbonis as a large marshy tract of land in the northern part of ancient Egypt in which
whole armies were said to have been swallowed up. See Encarta'95 Multimedia Encyclope-
dia, Serbonian, (Microsoft CD-ROM 1994). Later, Milton compared the Serbonian bog to
a location in hell "[w]here armies whole have sunk." JOHN MILTON, 2 PARADISE Losr 592-
94 (2d ed. 1674).
The phrase was used by Justice Cardozo in his dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance, Co. to warn the majority of the effect of forcing courts to distinguish be-
tween accidental death and accidental means. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins., Co., 291
U.S 491, 499 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("The attempted distinction between acciden-
tal death and accidental means will plunge this branch of law into a Serbonian Bog.").
Since then, courts and legal scholars have used the phrase to describe other murky areas of
the law where courts and lawyers can easily lose themselves in hazy distinctions and defini-
tions. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing a test
adopted by the Supreme Court majority as "the criminal law equivalent of Milton's 'Serbo-
nian Bog"'); Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evohtion of Acciden-
tal Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2000) (accidental death law); Jon Bauer, The
Character of the Questions and the Fitness of the Process: Mental Health, Bar Admissions
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 UCLA L. REV. 93, 132 (2001) ("this three-
pronged definition [of disability in the ADA] has become a Serbonian Bog"); Lloyd C.
Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New "Serbonian Bog" and Four Proposals for
Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998) (civil procedure). I thank Jeffrey Stempel for sug-
gesting the metaphor.
19. For an empirical study establishing a relationship between judicial preferences andjudicial behavior, see Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking
on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1635 (1998). For a summary of related re-
search, see id. at 1642-55 and sources cited therein.
20. My use of the term "valid" here and throughout this article draws on the language
of section 2 of the FAA and generally refers to contracts or contractual provisions that
satisfy contractual formation requirements that may be enforced because they are not sub-ject to a defense to enforcement. It thus includes contracts in which there is a defect of
formation, and therefore are void at law, as well as contracts that are induced by fraud,
duress, etc., and therefore are voidable at law. For a discussion on the distinction between
void and voidable, see I1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, COR13IN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1.6-1.7 (Jo-
seph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) and infra notes 200-01.
21. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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a result, fraud and other such challenges to the main contract will be de-
cided by an arbitrator and not a court of law.
For example, under the separability doctrine, a real property buyer's
action to void the transaction on fraud grounds would generally be de-
cided by an arbitrator rather than a court, if the sale agreement includes a
standard broad arbitration provision covering "all disputes arising out of
this agreement. ' 22 A court's power is limited by separability in such
cases to consideration of whether the arbitration clause itself was fraudu-
lently induced, separate and apart from any fraud involved in the larger
transaction. 23
For a society steeped in the belief in the right to one's "day in court, '24
the separability doctrine is counter-intuitive, and as a result has been dif-
ficult for many lower courts to implement,25 and has simply been rejected
by others as bad policy.26 This has led to massive doctrinal complexity,
confusion, and uncertainty; 27 it is one of the thickest areas in the bog.
Against this background, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1995 issued an
unusual opinion, unanimously agreeing in First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan28 that courts, not arbitrators, are to decide whether the parties
have agreed to arbitration unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably"
assign that function to the arbitrator. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized its reluctance to "force unwilling parties to arbitrate a
matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator,
would decide. ' 29 The underlying theory of the case appears to be that
assent to arbitration must be actual rather than implied. When applied in
the context of container contracts, First Options would suggest that
courts, not arbitrators, would decide the validity of contracts that include
arbitration provisions. 30 After all, an arbitration provision is just another
term in a contract, which, like any other, can only be enforced if the con-
tract itself is enforceable. 3'
Although the opinion was unanimous, scholars and courts have been
unsure about what to make of First Options, particularly its implications
for separability. Some distinguished scholars, such as Alan Scott Rau,
22. For more extended consideration of this hypothetical, see infra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
27. See IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., 2 FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 15.3 (1994) [herein-
after MACNEIL ET AL.]; STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.24
(2001).
28. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
29. Id. at 945 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 583 (1960)).
30. Significantly, the Court did not cite Prima Paint in First Options, nor did its deci-
sion acknowledge separability as an independent basis for allocating the "who decides"
question to arbitrators.
31. Voidable contracts, of course, can be ratified by the complaining party. See
CORBIN, supra note 20; infra notes 200-01.
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have contended that First Options merely restates current law. 32 Others,
such as the authors of a prominent arbitration treatise, have suggested
First Options has "the air of a pullback from the unmitigatedly pro-arbi-
tration decisions of the Supreme Court over the past dozen or so
years. '33 The Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue-the 2002
Term decision in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds34 and, to a lesser de-
gree, PacifiCare Health Systems v. Book 35-provides further evidence
that a more fundamental shift may be underway within the Court on arbi-
trability law-away from a patchwork of difficult, amorphous doctrines
and toward a more principled and functional approach that seeks to fur-
ther the reasonable expectations of the parties.
While two cases do not a revolution make, the continuation of this mo-
mentum would raise serious questions about the continued vitality of
Prima Paint's doctrine of separability,36 and its foundational principle of
implied consent. As Federal Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook has adroitly
noted, Prima Paint "sits uneasily alongside" of First Options,37 and lower
courts are just beginning to grasp the technical and jurisprudential ten-
sions between these cases. 38 How these tensions are resolved has crucial
significance for judicial access, for whether First Options's apparent re-
quirement of actual consent to arbitration in fact comes to supercede
Prima Paint's doctrine of separability will determine whether many dis-
putes arising from contracts that include an arbitration provision will be
heard and decided under law.
This Article describes the context and current state of the law in this
area under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),39 urges the Court to con-
32. See generally Alan Scott Rau, "The Arbitrability Question Itself," 10 AM. REV.
INT'L ARn. 287 (1999).
33. 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, §17.3.1.
34. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 588 (2002).
35. 123 S. Ct. 409 (2002). PacifiCare is a complex case about the about the validity of a
mandatory arbitration provision barring punitive damages in the context of a RICO claim
for which plaintiffs would be entitled to treble damages if successful. One of the issues the
case presents is whether a court or an arbitrator should make the decision about the en-
forceability of the arbitration provision in this context. See Petitioner's Brief Pac. Health
Sys., Inc. v. Book, 2002 WL 31789394 (Dec. 6, 2002) (No. 02-215) (arguing in favor of
arbitral resolution); Brief of Respondents at 5-16, Pac. Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL
144669 (Jan. 13, 2003) (No. 02-215) (arguing in favor of judicial resolution). The Court did
not reach this issue, however, ruling it premature because it was unclear that the arbitrator
would be precluded under the contract from awarding treble damages if they were found
to be remedial rather than punitive. Id. at 4-6.
36. The tension between actual and implied theories of consent to arbitration also
raises implications for other areas of arbitrability, as well as mandatory arbitration and the
manner of assent to arbitration more generally. These important issues are left for another
day, as they are beyond the scope of this article's narrow focus on separability and the
tension between First Options and Prima Paint.
37. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2002) (Eas-
terbrook, J.) (decided on other grounds). This decision came down long before the Su-
preme Court granted review in Howsam.
38. See infra notes 319-33 and accompanying text.
39. Arbitrations that are conducted pursuant to other authority, such as collective bar-
gaining agreements or international law, raise other issues, and are excluded from the
scope of this Article. William W. Park, The Case for Reform: Amending the FAA to Sepa-
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tinue its path toward actual consent to arbitration,40 and suggests an ap-
proach for finally reconciling the tension between Prima Paint and First
Options. Part II describes the nature and historical context of the arbi-
trability problem. In so doing, it describes the fundamental tension be-
tween collective "rule of law" values and individual freedom-of-contract
values that permeates arbitration jurisprudence, and which has contrib-
uted to significant generational change in judicial attitudes toward agree-
ments to arbitrate. It further places the more specific question of "who
decides" whether there is an agreement to arbitrate in the context of that
development, states the general rule that such arbitrability issues are to
be decided by courts, and lays out the four key exceptions to that general
rule.
Part III focuses specifically on the doctrine of separability, which is the
most critical (and most complex) of these exceptions. In particular, it
discusses and critiques the Prima Paint case that initiated the separability
doctrine and its rule of arbitral autonomy, the line of subsequent cases
that embrace Prima Paint's unstated principle of implied consent to arbi-
tration, the contraction of judicial access that results from separability,
and the confusion and uncertainty that separability has created in the
lower federal and state courts.
Part IV discusses the impact on separability of recent U.S. Supreme
Court case law, especially the 1995 decision in First Options that arbi-
trability issues are to be decided by the courts unless the parties "clearly
and unmistakably" agree to allocate that function to arbitrators. It also
discusses the 2002 Howsam decision that applied First Options in holding
that compliance with timing requirements for submissions of securities
arbitrations is a procedural issue for arbitrators to determine. 4' This sec-
tion further demonstrates how First Options and Howsam are among the
latest in a line of cases appearing to require actual manifestation of con-
sent to arbitration that is related to, but unconnected with, the implied
consent line of cases initiated by Prima Paint. Finally, it explores several
questions left open by the Court's analysis in First Options and Howsam.
Part V returns to separability and focuses on one of those questions:
the tension between First Options and Prima Paint. It examines how the
lower courts have begun to grapple with this tension, and argues that the
separability doctrine should be repudiated as archaic, unworkable, and
broader than necessary to accomplish its legitimate policy goals. Finally,
Part V contends that a more contemporary and normatively desirable un-
derstanding of Prima Paint would be to establish a rule of arbitrator com-
rate Domestic and International Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming
2003).
40. By "actual consent" in this article, I am referring to actual manifestations of as-
sent, supported by consideration, that are consistent with the objective theory of contract,
not actual consent in the sense of a "meeting of the minds" under the subjective theory of
contract. For more on this distinction, see CORBIN, supra note 20, § 4.12.
41. The PacifiCare decision is not discussed in detail, see supra note 35, because the
Court did not address the arbitrability issue in a substantial way. See 123 S. Ct. at n.2.
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petence to determine their jurisdiction. Such an understanding would
permit Prima Paint to shed its controversial and overbroad husk of sepa-
rability while leaving its core principle of arbitral authority intact. More-
over, recognition of this competence-competence of arbitrators would be
consistent with party expectations, the Court's apparent current trajec-
tory of actual consent, and international legal standards.
II. NAVIGATING THE SERBONIAN BOG OF ARBITRABILITY
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL TENSION AND GENERATIONAL CHANGE
IN ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE
Arbitrability generally deals with the question of whether parties have
agreed to arbitrate a dispute, the scope of that agreement, and the more
"arcane" question of who decides those two issues.42
These questions implicate the underlying struggle that Anglo-Ameri-
can courts have had for centuries with the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, 43 as they raise a fundamental tension between two often com-
peting values:44 freedom of contract versus the rule of law45 that is neces-
sary in a society that depends on "the concept of ordered liberty. '46
Questions of arbitrability implicate this tension because they require
courts to choose between these two competing norms. 47 Judges who tend
to favor freedom of contract values often tend to interpret arbitration
issues in a way that promotes arbitration. Judges who tend to favor rule-
of-law values often tend to interpret arbitration issues in a way that is
more concerned with preserving judicial access rights.
This judicial choice is further influenced by a variety of other incen-
tives, including the institutional interests that courts have in the efficient
42. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945. For a general discussion, see 2 MACNEIL ET AL.,
supra note 27, § 15.1.
43. For a concise general discussion of history of the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, see Reuben, supra note 2, at 598-601 and sources cited therein.
44. This is a familiar source of tension in the law, one that, for example, led the U.S.
Supreme Court to one of its darker periods through a temporary embrace of contractual
rights over individual liberties. For a general discussion of the so-called "Lochner-era," see
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 460-73 (13th ed.
1997).
45. "Rule of law" values include such principles as: parties should be treated equally
before the law; the law should be fundamentally fair as a substantive matter; the law
should be predictable, stable, and transparent; and judges should be neutral and indepen-
dent. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989) (discussing the advantages of establishing general rules of law); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 671, 678 (1999); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Digni-
tary Theory, 6.1 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886-87 (1981).
46. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Carrington and Haagen suggest
that the Court's recently renewed embrace of contract rights is one explanation for its
strong support of contractual arbitration. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Con-
tract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuiP. C. REV. 331, 334.
47. For a similar analysis, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: De-




processing of legalized disputes (i.e., docket reduction), the types of arbi-
tration clauses presented to courts by parties seeking to maximize per-
sonal gain, as well as the ideological preferences of individual judges.48
As a result, the fundamental tension does not easily permit sustainable
resolution, and indeed is in part responsible for a difficult case law that is
heavily nuanced, constantly shifting, and often inconsistent and
confusing.49
Historically, much of the action on the fundamental tension has fo-
cused on questions of arbitrability, and prevailing judicial attitudes have
swung like a pendulum.50 On one end, courts dating back to medieval
England struck the balance on the fundamental tension in favor of public
norms and rule-of-law values, refusing under the "ouster doctrine" to en-
force agreements to arbitrate as a matter of policy because those agree-
ments improperly denied the courts of their jurisdiction to decide legal
disputes according to the rule of law. 5' Despite a major initiative to re-
verse this policy legislatively, culminating in the U.S. Arbitration Act of
1925,52 this judicial hostility held sway until the 1980s,53 when the U.S.
Supreme Court set forth a series of opinions recalibrating the balance on
the fundamental tension in favor of broad support for arbitration.
5 4
As Professor Stempel suggests, this new-found judicial deference to ar-
bitration may have been spurred by perceptions of the halcyon nature of
labor arbitration as a successful alternative to workplace strikes, back
when arbitration was the primary form of "old" ADR, roughly before
1976.55 These arbitrations tended to involve insular groups (such as col-
48. For a discussion of these and other incentives affecting judicial decision making,
see Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Every-
body Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. EcoN. REV. 1. 13-15 (1993).
49. Others have been harsher in their descriptions. See, e.g., 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra
note 27, § 17.3.1 ("chaotic state of the law"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. 1381, 1412-17 (1996) (discussing "the Supreme Court's schizophrenia and result-
driven interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act").
50. See Richard C. Reuben, The Pendulum Swings Again: Badie, Wright Decisions
Underscore Importance of Actual Assent to Arbitration, 6 DisP. RESOL. MA¢. 18 (Fall
1999).
51. For a concise discussion, see Reuben, supra note 2, at 599-605 and sources cited
therein.
52. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 13, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994)).
53. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
54. Id.; see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
Sup. Cir. REV. 331, 363-79 (1996). Interestingly, when Prima Paint was decided, arbitration
constituted much of ADR universe, which might help explain the unseemingly strong sup-
port of Justice Abe Fortas, see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395, 397-407 (1967), and Justice Wil-
liam Brennan, see Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 4-29
(1983).
55. 1976 is often used as a rough point of demarcation because that was the year of the
so-called Pound Conference, at which Frank E.A. Sander's legendary "multi-door court-
house" speech is generally credited with kicking off the modern ADR movement. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial A DR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:
Fair Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledging Adulthood?, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
297, 309 (1996). For the speech itself, see Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Process-
ing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 337 (A. Leo
Levine & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1976).
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lective bargaining units), to be industry specific (such as the diamond in-
dustry), 56 and to involve commercial matters focusing on issues of
contractual interpretation or performance. 57 However, as arbitration has
evolved in the "new" era of ADR, deference to arbitration is less appro-
priate because it has come to be more likely to affect large classes of
persons or entities, more likely to affect personal rather than commercial
matters, more likely to pit one-time litigants against "repeat players," and
more likely to involve statutory and other rights rather than matters of
industry custom or contractual interpretation and performance. 58 This
may be one reason why, after a burst of judicial exuberance, 59 the Court
now appears to be settling on a less permissive, more centrist, traditional
contract theory,60 seeking to compel a party into arbitration "only [for]
those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration. '61
These broad contextual themes are helpful, if not essential, in under-
standing the difficult state of arbitration law in general. Moreover, as we
shall see, one manifestation of this generational change in the arbi-
trability context is the seemingly schizophrenic emergence of two related
but unconnected lines of cases on the manner of consent necessary to
forge an enforceable agreement to arbitrate: one indicating that implied
consent to arbitrate is sufficient, 62 the other suggesting that actual con-
sent is required.63
B. THE FAA: A LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL TENSION
The requirement of some kind of consent to arbitration arises from the
Federal Arbitration Act, which legislatively sought to reverse the ouster
doctrine through a unique legislative compromise between the commer-
cial and legal communities: 64 agreements to arbitrate, previously unen-
56. The diamond industry provides a paradigmatic example of such an idealized view
of the old arbitration. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con-
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
57. See Stempel, supra note 55, at 335-36 (comparing characteristics of "old" ADR
and "new" ADR).
58. See id. at 334-38.
59. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (compelling
arbitration of federal age discrimination claim); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (compelling securities fraud claims under the 1934 Act);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (compelling arbitration of
securities fraud claims under the 1933 Act and RICO).
60. See Reuben, supra note 50; Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional
Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L.
REV. 195 (1998); see also infra notes 228-46 and accompanying text.
61. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960)); see also Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 592; PacifiCare, 2003
WL 1791225, at *4 n.2.
62. See infra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
64. The two key leaders of this movement were Julius Henry Cohen, an attorney with
connections to state bar and national bar associations, and Charles L. Bernheimer, a cotton
products company president with ties to local, state, and national chambers of commerce.
For a discussion of their respective roles in the drafting of the New York Arbitration Law
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forceable as a matter of public policy, would be enforced just like any
other agreement, as long as the agreement is enforceable as a matter of
contract law.65 Thus the heart of the FAA is found in section 2, which
provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.66
The FAA's repeal of the ouster doctrine promoted commercial inter-
ests in the legitimacy, certainty, and finality of agreements to arbitrate. 67
It satisfied legal concerns by delineating a set of procedural safeguards,
the cornerstone of which was the requirement of a contractually enforce-
able agreement to arbitrate. 68 The assurance of the validity of the agree-
ment to arbitrate was accomplished through a fairly intricate mechanism
that looked to the institutional competence of courts to serve as gate-
keepers of contractual arbitration by calling upon them to determine if
there was consent to arbitrate a given dispute or range of disputes as a
matter of state contract law. In particular, section 4 permits a court to
compel an unwilling party into arbitration if it is satisfied that there is an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate; if not, then section 4 leaves the dis-
pute to the court.69 Section 3 further requires a court to stay legal pro-
ceedings to permit the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate that is
found enforceable.70
of 1920, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the 1924 draft act submitted to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 8 (1923) (testimony
of W.H.H. Piatt). For a greater discussion of the legislative history, see infra note 143.
65. For a definitive legislative history on the FAA, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
66. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (emphasis added); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7
U.L.A. 1 (1997).
67. For a classic statement with regard to the importance of arbitration in promoting
private ordering in the labor context, see David E. Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its
Glory are Numbered, 2 INDUs. REL. L.J. 97, 101 (1977).
68. Other elements of the legislative compromise included what would become other
major pillars of arbitration's legitimacy as a process: the impartiality of the neutral and the
requirement that the arbitrator stay within the scope of his or her authority. Both of these
issues were spelled out in the FAA as reasons for the vacatur of an arbitration award. 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1999).
69. "The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall
make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
of the agreement .... " 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1999).
70. The "court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue in-
volved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had" 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1999).
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The legislative compromise on the fundamental tension was thus built
upon the foundation of traditional contractual consent, providing for the
repeal of the ouster doctrine, and the specific enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate, as long as any questions about whether such an agreement in
fact existed were decided in a court of law according to traditional rules
of state contract law. This approach reflected the drafters' vision of ac-
tual consent to arbitration as a predicate to the legitimacy of using the
state's coercive power to compel an unwilling party into arbitration when
a dispute actually arises, and was especially important considering the
Act's severe limitations on post-hoc substantive review. 71
While the compromise gave the FAA its unique structure, 72 it did little
to resolve the fundamental tension in arbitration between public rule-of-
law norms and private contractual rights. Instead, it merely shifted that
struggle away from the categorical refusal of courts to enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate under the ouster doctrine to the more individualized
determination of whether parties in a particular case agreed to arbitrate a
particular matter-that is, to the battlefield of arbitrability.
C. MAPPING THE BoG: THE CONFUSED MEANING
OF "ARBITRABILITY"
In considering arbitrability, it is essential to distinguish between two
different levels of analysis. The first level is the substantive issue of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, and the scope of that
agreement. The second level is the more "arcane" procedural level of
who decides the existence and scope of an arbitration agreement: the
"who decides" question. 73
Unfortunately, the term "arbitrability" has come to embrace-and
confuse-a series of similar but analytically distinct issues relating to
agreements to arbitrate. The analytical abyss that has inevitably followed
does not permit easy synthesis;74 even simple discussion is often inhibited
by the frailty of language in allowing for nuance.7 5 As a result, one lead-
71. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1999) (vacatur).
72. For an argument that this structure is sufficient to establish state action for pur-
poses of requiring minimal but meaningful due process protections in arbitrations con-
ducted under the FAA, see generally Reuben, supra note 2.
73. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
74. See Conrad K. Harper, The Options in First Options: International Arbitration and
Arbitral Competence, 579 PLI/Lrr 127, 136-43 (1998) and cases cited therein.
75. The varying meanings of the word "arbitrability" underscore the inadequacy of
our current vocabulary in accommodating substantive nuance and the perceptions of vary-
ing listeners. The phrase "arbitration agreement" is similarly ambiguous, potentially refer-
ring to a stand-alone agreement to arbitrate, or to an arbitration provision in larger
contract-the issues raised by separability. These slippery slopes lead to a greater appreci-
ation for the Yupik Eskimos of Alaska, who developed a wide variety of words to describe
snow with a precision that reflected the central significance of snow to their lives. See Joel
Sherzer, A Richness of Voices, in AMERICA IN 1492: THE WORLD OF THE INDIAN PEOPLES
BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF COLUMiBUS 251, 255 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., ed., 1993); BENJA-
MIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOi-UGHT AND REALITY 213 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956).
Analysis of arbitrability issues would do well with similar precision, as context is not always
helpful in clarifying intended meaning.
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ing arbitration scholar has mused wistfully that "'arbitrability' is a word
that might well be banned from our vocabulary entirely-or at least re-
stricted, as in other legal systems, to the notion of what society will permit
arbitrators to do." 76
It is therefore helpful to identify the major related but clearly distinct
questions that are commonly and crudely clumped together under the
general heading of "arbitrability," and to recognize that they operate at
both the substantive level and the "who decides" level. These questions
principally include: 77
1. Whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate (and
who decides);78
2. Whether a specific issue or dispute is included within the scope of
the arbitration agreement (and who decides);
3. Whether any conditions that might be necessary to trigger the con-
tractual duty to arbitrate have been satisfied (and who decides). 79
A related and important concept that is also sometimes included within
the rubric of "arbitrability" is the question of whether an arbitrator may
decide his or her own jurisdiction, a concept known in international and
comparative commercial arbitration as competence-competence, or
kompetenz-kompetenz.8 0 While this doctrine does not settle easily into
the architecture of American law, the concept is extraordinarily impor-
tant to arbitration and arguably constitutes the legitimate core of Prima
Paint separability, as discussed below.8'
76. See Rau, supra note 32, at 308. Judicial confusion has been acknowledged at all
levels, including the U.S. Supreme Court. Consider this passage from the oral arguments in
First Options:
"QUESTION: Then how would you describe a question of whether a partic-
ular subject is subject to the arbitration agreement, which the parties conced-
edly agreed to?
ANSWER: Well, in other words, there is an arbitration contract, and there's
a dispute. Is that-that's also called arbitrability.
QUESTION: Yes, that's what confuses me. It seems to me it's two distinct
things, and people call them the same thing." Transcript of Oral Argument,
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 1995 WL 242250 at *2930 (March 22,
1995) No. 94-560.
77. While it is less relevant to the issues raised in this article, one may also add to this
list of "arbitrability" issues the degree to which public policy may prohibit the parties'
wishes regarding the arbitration submission. See William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta
in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?,
12 ARB. INT'L J. 137, 143-45 (1996).
78. This is the question that is at the heart of section 4 of the FAA, and includes issues
relating to the capacity of an arbitration agreement to bind third parties. The third-party
problem has not received a great deal of scholarly attention, but for a discussion in the
employment context, see Recent Case, Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc, 269 F.3d
753 (7th Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 2066 (2002).
79. This question has come to be known as "procedural arbitrability." See infra notes
92-102 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
81. See infra Part III.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
D. THE "WHO DECIDES" QUESTION
The judicial access problem is chiefly implicated by the "who decides"
aspect of arbitrability, because the structure of the legislative compromise
predicates the enforcement of an arbitration provision on its contractual
enforceability at law. Put another way, to the extent one gets one's "day
in court" in arbitration under the FAA, that day comes if and when there
is a question about whether a party may be compelled into arbitration. 82
As a general matter, the FAA is fairly explicit in stating the general
rule that courts decide arbitrability. 83 However, at least four major doc-
trinal strands have emerged to provide exceptions that significantly erode
that general rule: the doctrine of default rules,84 the doctrine of procedu-
ral arbitrability, the doctrine of competence-competence, and the doctrine
of separability. These doctrines generally correlate with the basic arbi-
trability questions previously identified.
1. The Doctrine of Default Rules: Parties Submit Arbitrability Issue to
the Arbitrator
The doctrine of default rules roughly correlates with the questions of
who decides whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate, and who de-
cides whether a specific issue is within the scope of that submission to
arbitration.85
This doctrine recognizes that many sections of the Federal Arbitration
Act are "default rules," or rules that will govern agreements to arbitrate
unless the parties decide otherwise and incorporate their preferred rules
into their arbitration agreement.8 6 Default rules stand in contrast to
mandatory rules, which parties are not free to waive or revise.87 Most of
the FAA provisions relating to the manner in which the arbitration is
conducted would likely be considered default rules that the parties could
vary by contractual agreement, such as section 7's rules regarding witness
testimony.88 By contrast, the provisions that are directed at the courts
likely would be considered mandatory rules that the parties could not
change by contractual agreement, such as section 16's rules regarding ap-
82. The so-called "procedural justice" literature on the significance of one's "day in
court" is vast. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 953, 985
(1990) (parties who have their day in court are more likely to feel as though they were
treated fairly by the justice system and to be satisfied with the process and outcome).
83. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. See generally 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, § 15.4.1.
84. While the notion of default rules is hardly new, my construct of it as a "doctrine" is
original, for better or for worse. For an important discussion of default rules in the arbitra-
tion context, see Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999). For a more general discussion, see Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
85. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (party selection of
choice of law rules is not preempted by FAA).
87. See Ware, supra note 84, at 706-07.
88. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1999).
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peals of arbitral awards. 89
Under the doctrine of default rules, the general rule that courts decide
arbitrability issues is a default rule that the parties may change by express
contractual agreement. 90 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in First Op-
tions, "the question 'who has the primary power to decide arbitrability'
turns on what the parties agreed about the matter. Did the parties agree
to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration?" 91
2. The Doctrine of Procedural Arbitrability
A second vehicle that courts have used in answering the "who decides"
question is to divide the concept of arbitrability into two familiar catego-
ries-substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability92-both of
which must be present before a dispute can be arbitrated. 93
Under this doctrine, substantive arbitrability is understood to focus on
the question of whether a dispute is encompassed by an agreement to
arbitrate. The focus here is on the substantive merits of the particular
dispute, and whether the parties agreed to include it within the submis-
sion to arbitration. Procedural arbitrability, on the other hand, focuses on
a different question: whether any conditions that might trigger a duty to
arbitrate under an enforceable arbitration provision have been fulfilled.94
This includes such procedural issues as time limits, notice, waiver, estop-
pel, and other conditions precedent to the obligation to arbitrate. Under
the doctrine of procedural arbitrability, these issues are decided by the
arbitrator, not the court, on the theory that they are included within the
scope of the arbitration provision.95 Moreover, all procedural require-
ments must be satisfied before the duty to arbitrate is triggered. 96
The rationale for the doctrine of procedural arbitrability is to further
the contracting intent of the parties when there is no dispute that there is,
in fact, an actual agreement to arbitrate, as well as to promote the judicial
system's interest in efficiency. Procedural arbitrability honors the parties'
89. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1999). For a discussion of problems relating to judicial review of
arbitral awards, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants: The Overlooked Problem
of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1199 (2000).
90. For a more thorough discussion, see 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, § 15.1.4.1.
91. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
92. For an application of the substantive-procedural distinction in civil procedure, see
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For an application in the administrative
law context, see JEM Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For a
critique of this and other such distinctions seen in fundamental law, see Duncan Kennedy,
The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350-57
(1982).
93. 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, § 15.1.4.2.
94. Procedural arbitrability correlates with the third fundamental arbitrability ques-
tion. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). For a criticism,
see Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1992). For a general
discussion, see KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: TtIE LAW OF ALTERNA-
TIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 498-516 (2000).
96. See supra note 93.
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perceived interest in efficiency by preventing the delay and higher costs
in dispute resolution that can arise from having courts decide technical
questions of whether the conditions giving rise to the specific duty to ar-
bitrate had been satisfied. 97 Similarly, it respects judicial economy by re-
lieving courts of the difficult tasks of separating substantive and
procedural issues, and of deciding matters that parties were willing to
submit to an arbitrator. At a more theoretical level, procedural arbi-
trability represents a policy choice based on the institutional competence
of arbitrators to decide matters arising under the contract. 98 For these
reasons, even close calls on "mixed cases" will tend to be decided by the
arbitrator rather than the courts.9 9
Still, the case law is hardly consistent in categorizing an issue as sub-
stantive or procedural. 0 0 A common example is the question of whether
the moving party has made a timely demand for arbitration, which was
generally at issue in Howsam. Some courts have ruled that courts should
decide this issue,' 10 while others, including the U.S. Supreme Court in
Howsam, have left it for the arbitrators. 10 2
3. The Doctrine of Competence-Competence
The doctrine of competence-competence, or kompetenz-kompetenz, 0 3
is most familiar in the international or comparative commercial arbitra-
tion context, and refers generally to the independent authority of the ar-
bitrator to decide the limits of his or her own jurisdiction.10 4
97. The doctrine of procedural arbitrability is particularly significant in the commer-
cial construction industry, where large projects like office buildings and bridges require the
coordinated activity of many different players, including architects, general contractors,
and subcontractors. Problems at any point in the chain can create legal disputes elsewhere
in the chain, potentially delaying or derailing the project's completion. As a result, the
pragmatic need for certainty, speed, expertise, and finality in dispute resolution-arguably
arbitration's central virtues-make a particularly compelling argument for the resolution
of arbitrability disputes by arbitrators rather than courts. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Of "Pro-
cedural Arbitrability": The Effect of Noncompliance with Contract Claims Procedures, 40
S.C. L. REV. 847 (1989).
98. See Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 593.
99. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 559.
100. Given the difficulty that courts have had with the substance/procedure distinction
in other contexts, this should not be surprising. See supra note 92 and sources cited therein.
101. See, e.g., Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Med. Ctr., Inc., 334 A.2d 526
(1975).
102. The Court's decision in Howsam was limited to the interpretation of the unique
six-year rule for determining eligibility for arbitration in the securities industry. For an
example of a court ruling that arbitrators decide arbitrability in another context, see Con-
tracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, 713 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1983), in which
a party alleged several procedural defects that should have precluded arbitration, including
failure to make a timely demand, failure to document extra work, and failure to comply
with contract requirements for "equitable adjustment" of the contract price.
103. While American scholars often use competence-competence and kompetenz-
kompetenz interchangeably, internationalists tend to equate kompetenz-kompetenz with
the stricter form of the doctrine adopted in Germany. See infra note 104 and accompanying
text. Telephone Interview with William W. Park, Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law (Aug. 19, 2002).
104. W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AR131-
"rRAT'ON 515-16 (3rd ed. 2000); see also William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selec-
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The most critical issue raised by competence-competence is whether the
arbitrator has the power to invalidate the contract granting his or her
authority to decide the dispute.105 Theoretically, if the arbitrator does not
have this power, the arbitration proceedings would have to be halted
pending judicial decision whenever a question arose that would implicate
the authority of the arbitrator to rule on a particular issue, such as the
validity of the contract as a whole. The doctrine of competence-compe-
tence sensibly addresses this problem by assuming that the parties chose
arbitration precisely to avoid these types of delays in the resolution of
their dispute, and by further assuming that the parties intended for the
arbitrator to decide this question. 10 6
The doctrine is widely recognized internationally although there are
many different strands, which vary primarily on the timing of judicial in-
tervention. 10 7 Under the English model, arbitrators may decide their ju-
risdiction, but a court can review that decision at any time. 10 8 By contrast,
the French model does not permit judicial review until after the award
has been rendered. 10 9 The Swiss model splits the difference, permitting
arbitrators to decide jurisdictional questions, but permitting parties to
bring an interlocutory appeal at any time. 1" 0 Finally, the German ap-
proach to what it terms kompetenz-kompetenz is a particularly strong
one, not only reserving jurisdiction in the arbitrator to decide jurisdiction,
but ultimately precluding later judicial review of that decision."'
Significantly, the United States has never formally adopted the doc-
trine of competence-competence, although some have argued that the U.S.
Supreme Court has effectively adopted it by implication, either in First
Options'12 or in the concept of Prima Paint separability-the fourth ex-
ception to the FAA's general rule of allocating judicial decisions to
courts.' 13
tion: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court Selection, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
19, 46-47 (1998).
105. See Rau, supra note 32, at 340; Park, supra note 77.
106. CRAIG, ET AL., supra note 104, at 515; see also Fluor Daniel Intercontinental, Inc.
v. Gen. Elec., No. 98 Civ. 7181, 1999 WL 637236 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1999). A rule provid-
ing arbitrators with such authority "is a necessary part of just about any arbitration re-
gime." E-mail from Christopher R. Drahozal, Professor of Law, University of Kansas
School of Law, to Richard C. Reuben, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law (Aug. 6, 2002, 09:21 CST) (on file with author).
107. For a thorough exploration of these timing differences, see Natasha Wyss, First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72
TUL. L. REV. 351 (1997).
108. See Park, supra note 77, at 149-50.
109. Id. at 150.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 151.
112. See Park, supra note 104, at 53 n.164. For an analysis of how First Options compe-
tence-competence compares with international standards, see Shirin Philipp, Is the Supreme
Court Bucking the Trend? First Options v. Kaplan in Light of European Reform Initiatives
in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 119 (1996).
113. See William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Be-
tween Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133, 143 (1997) (suggesting Prima
Paint is a form of competenz-competenz).
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4. The Doctrine of Separability
Although treated last here, the doctrine of separability is the most sig-
nificant exception to the FAA's general rule that courts decide questions
of arbitrability. Like the doctrine of default rules, the doctrine of separa-
bility roughly correlates with the questions of who decides whether the
parties have agreed to arbitrate, and who decides whether a specific issue
is within the scope of arbitration submission." 4 It addresses a very spe-
cific question: who decides whether a dispute over the validity of a con-
tract containing an arbitration provision must be arbitrated when the
allegation is that the very contract that contains the arbitration provision
is itself a legally unenforceable contract? The traditional short answer,
often shocking to initiates to the doctrine, is that the arbitrator decides
this question of arbitrability. The problem is complicated and merits a
closer look.
III. SEPARABILITY: THE GREATEST HAZARD IN THE BOG
When an arbitration provision is included in a larger contract, and the
dispute is about the validity of that larger contract, the traditional view, at
least for much of the last half of the twentieth century, has been that
arbitrators, not courts, decide the validity of that larger contract. The
arbitration provision is presumed to be valid as a contractual agreement
that is separate and independent of the larger "container" contract. This
is the doctrine of separability, which is predicated upon a principle of
implied consent to arbitrability.
A. ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM
Suppose Buyer purchases residential property in Minnesota, and after
taking possession discovers serious problems with the house's brick ve-
neer, despite express assurances by Missouri Seller in the disclosure form
stating that there are no "defects or problems, current or past, to the
structure or exterior veneer."' 5 Preliminary investigation indicates
Seller likely was aware of the problem.
Under traditional principles of common law, the analysis is straightfor-
ward. The law provides Buyer a contract remedy in the form of an action
alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract, which will entitle Buyer
to some form of relief, either in monetary damages or in the rescission of
114. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
115. This hypothetical is drawn from Marks v. Bean, 57 S.W.3d 303 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001),
which considered and rejected separability in holding that courts are to decide a fraud in
the inducement claim directed at the container contract. Minnesota and Missouri have
been chosen as forums to establish diversity jurisdiction to avoid the complicating question
of federal preemption of state arbitration law. For a discussion, see Stephen L. Hayford,
Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues under the Revised Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, 2001 J. Disi,. Ri-soL. 67, 68. For a criticism, see David S. Schwartz, Correcting
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbi-




the contract. In other words, Buyer can just go to court and assert her
rights under the law.' 1 6
Now, suppose that the parties used the local real estate board's stan-
dard form Sales and Purchasing Contract to effect the transaction, and
that this form included a broadly worded arbitration provision in para-
graph 15, stating simply: "All disputes arising under this contract shall be
decided by arbitration."'" 7 Buyer files her fraud claim in federal district
court, and Seller counters with a motion to compel the arbitration under
section 4 of the FAA, alleging that the fraud claim should be decided by
an arbitrator rather than the court because it is a dispute "arising under
this contract."
The court is faced with a dilemma that again recalls the fundamental
tension: on the one hand, as Seller contends, with a typical broadly
worded arbitration provision, a post-contract dispute over whether the
dispute must be arbitrated would seem to fall into the category of "all
disputes arising under this contract." On the other hand, as Buyer would
likely contend, the arbitration statute should be read to provide that the
arbitration clause is enforceable only if the underlying contract itself is
enforceable to begin with, and only a court of law has the power at law to
make that determination.
The consequences of the decision for access to courts and law are enor-
mous, as a trial court is obliged to proceed under applicable rules of pro-
cedure and evidence as well as the substantive law, and is subject to
judicial review for the correction of legal errors. An arbitrator, however,
is not so compelled, because arbitration is by definition an informal adju-
dicatory process that is not bound by the rule of law, and which, indeed,
need not even be conducted by a lawyer." 8
This is the problem that the. separability doctrine seeks to address:
whether a court or arbitrator should decide a dispute over the validity of
a contract that includes an arbitration clause. In the early dawn of the
modern ADR movement, when judicial hostility toward arbitration
agreements still prevailed, the U.S. Supreme Court answered this ques-
tion for purposes of the FAA in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manu-
facturing. Co.' '9 by adopting a rule of "separability" that essentially
allocates the decision to the arbitrator when the challenge involves the
main "container" contract. 20 Although relatively obscure today, this de-
cision has had a profound impact on the law of modern arbitration, effec-
116. Hayford, supra note 115, at 68.
117. Many state real estate boards have, in fact, included mandatory arbitration clauses
in their standard form real estate purchase agreements. See, e.g., Purchase Agreement
Approved by the Minnesota Association of Realtors (copy on file with author). For a dis-
cussion of the growth of arbitration in the construction industry, see Colleen A. Libbey,
Working Together While "Waltzing in a Minefield": Successful Government Construction
Contract Dispute Resolution with Partnering and Dispute Review Boards, 15 OHIo ST . ON
Disp. RESOL. 825, 849 n.7 (2000).
118. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
119. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
120. Id. at 403-04.
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tively initiating the Supreme Court's extraordinary push to get lower
courts to abandon their hostility to agreements to arbitrate, to take the
FAA seriously,121 and ushering in the modern age of judicial support for
arbitration and other ADR methods.
B. PRIMA PAINT AND SEPARABILITY
Before Prima Paint, most courts held that if a party challenged the va-
lidity of a contract that included an arbitration provision on the kinds of
contractual grounds contemplated by the FAA, the question would be
decided by a court. 122 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Judicial Circuit had reached an opposite conclusion, holding in Rob-
ert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 123 that a broad arbitration
provision in a larger contract was a separate contract for purposes of the
"who decides" question, and that courts would decide challenges directed
exclusively at the narrow arbitration provision, while arbitrators would
decide challenges to the validity of the broader container contract.
The Supreme Court's 6-3 decision in Prima Paint settled this split in the
circuits by adopting the rule of Robert Lawrence. The case arose out of a
consulting contract under which Flood & Conklin was to perform certain
work for Prima Paint's paint manufacturing business for six years.' 24
When the relationship broke down, Prima Paint started making its pay-
ments to an escrow company instead of Flood & Conklin, and told the
consultants that as far as Prima Paint was concerned, Flood & Conklin
had breached its contract by fraudulently representing that it was solvent
when in fact Flood & Conklin was about to file for bankruptcy. 125
Flood & Conklin responded with a notice of intent to arbitrate pursu-
ant to a broad general arbitration clause in the consulting contract, which
provided that "any controversy or claim arising out of or related to this
Agreement ... shall be settled by arbitration."' 126 Prima Paint responded
in turn by filing suit in federal district court seeking to rescind the con-
sulting contract on formation grounds, arguing that Flood & Conklin had
fraudulently induced it to enter the contract by holding itself out as sol-
vent. Applying the Second Circuit's rule of Robert Lawrence, the trial
121. The Court decided two other issues that were extremely important to the Court's
current FAA jurisprudence, but beyond the scope of this article. First, the Court held that
the consulting agreement giving rise to the arbitration involved interstate commerce in a
manner sufficient to trigger the application of the Federal Arbitration Act as an initial
matter. Second, the Court held that the FAA is constitutional under Congress's Commerce
and Maritime powers.
122. See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil. Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 923-24 (1st
Cir. 1960). See generally KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 514 (2000); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitra-
tion Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1355 (1985).
123. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
124. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1966).
The rest of the facts are drawn from the circuit court opinion in Prima Paint unless other-
wise noted.
125. Id. at 316, 317.
126. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 398.
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court ruled that the fraud claim had to be decided in arbitration. 127 The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Abe Fortas, affirmed, 2 8 stating:
Under § 4 ... the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to
proceed once it is satisfied that the 'making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply (with the arbitration agreement)
is not in issue.' Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of
the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes to the 'making' of
the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudi-
cate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal court
to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract
generally. 12 9
An incredulous Justice Hugo Black, in a dissent joined by Justices Wil-
liam 0. Douglas and Potter Stewart, wrote:
The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue of a
contract's voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons des-
ignated to arbitrate factual controversies arising out of a valid con-
tract between the parties. And the arbitrators who the Court holds
are to adjudicate the legal validity of the contract need not even be
lawyers, and in all probability will be nonlawyers, wholly unqualified
to decide legal issues, and even if qualified to apply the law, not
bound to do so .... [ ] I am fully satisfied that a reasonable and fair
reading of [the FAA's] language and history shows that both Con-
gress and the framers of the Act were at great pains to emphasize
that nonlawyers designated to adjust and arbitrate factual controver-
sies arising out of valid contracts would not trespass upon the courts'
prerogative to decide the legal question of whether any legal con-
tract exists upon which to base an arbitration. 30
C. CRITICISMS OF PRIMA PAINT SEPARABILITY
Justice Black's dissent provides, at the very least, a road map for a
more formal critique of the Court's holding on separability; although to
date it has drawn only minimal attention by scholars. Even then it has
been viewed with considerable skepticism by scholars from across the
ideological spectrum-including those on both sides of the mandatory ar-
bitration debate. 13 1 These passing shots cry out for a more substantial
127. Prima Paint, 360 F.2d at 318.
128. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04.
129. Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 128-32 (1996) (calling for Prima Paint to be overruled); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1426-56 (1991) (oppos-
ing separability except for situations in which proof of the defense would be "ineffective to
undermine the resisting party's consent to arbitration"); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the
Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 456 (1993) ("The Court's construction of the
FAA moved court access for common law claims from an inalienable right to one more
easily alienable than many other underlying rights."); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic
Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,




1. The Statutory Analysis Critiques
The Court rested its opinion exclusively on its analysis of the statutory
language "the making of the agreement to arbitrate" in section 4 of the
FAA, and related language in section 3.132 However, this set of critiques
suggests that the Court's analysis frustrated at least two cardinal canons
of statutory interpretation-the "whole act rule" and the "rule against
surplusage"-and even then is logically flawed.
a. Canons of Statutory Construction Violated
The "whole act rule" is a universal principle of statutory interpretation
that calls for a court to consider a statutory provision not in isolation but
rather in relationship to other provisions of the Act as a whole. 133 In
Prima Paint, however, this critique would contend that the Court failed to
interpret the language in sections 3 and 4 in light of the FAA's fundamen-
tal operating provision: the section 2 reversal of the ouster doctrine. t 34 A
more faithful application of the "whole act rule" would have construed
the technical implementation provisions of sections 3 and 4 to facilitate
rather than defeat section 2's assurance of the arbitration provision's con-
tractual validity-thus vesting the arbitrability of the container contract's
validity in the courts.
Similarly, this critique would contend that the Court's construction vio-
separability doctrine); David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck: The Collision Be-
tween Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST'. Louis U. L.J. 561, 561, 565, 572 (1997) (stating that Prima
Paint marks the beginning of the U.S. Supreme Court's "rewriting" of the FAA into a
docket-clearing device); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 33, 83-84 (arguing that the Court's reasoning in Prima Paint begs the question);
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1952-53 (1996) (describing the Court's reasoning in Prima Paint as
"evasive, somewhat tortuous reasoning"); Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment
Disputes Without Unions, 66 CH.-KENr L. REV. 753, 765 (1990) (stating that the Court's
decision in Prima Paint had no policy justification); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sui,. Cr. REV. 331, 401 (1996) (calling Prima Paint part of
the "shantytown" of U.S. Supreme Court's arbitration law); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking
the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV.
1, 100 (1997) (stating that it is "difficult to imagine a factual scenario in which a party
would use fraud solely to impose an arbitration clause and not to affect other essential
terms of a contract"). But see Rau, supra note 32, at 341 (describing the prospect of arbi-
trator incompetence to decide jurisdiction as a "conceptual horror"); Park, supra note 77,
at 143 (stating that the separability doctrine gives arbitrators the power to invalidate the
main agreement without affecting their jurisdiction to hear the case); Stipanowich, supra
note 97, at 872 (endorsing procedural arbitrability for construction disputes).
132. See supra notes 69-70.
133. For an extensive discussion of the "whole act rule," see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., Er AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 263-76 (2000), which notes
that the rule is universally followed in both federal and state courts, in civil courts, as well
as the courts of other common-law countries.
134. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400.
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lates the "rule against surplusage," 135 effectively rendering the "at law or
equity" provision in section 2's "savings" clause inoperative because prin-
ciples of law and equity do not apply in arbitration proceedings. 36 Since
issues of law and equity can only be decided by courts (or administrative
agencies by valid delegation), the "rule against surplusage" would compel
a construction of sections 3 and 4 that would give the "at law or equity"
clause meaning by holding that contractual defenses to the validity of the
container contract would be decided by a court of law or equity, just as
"any other contract."' 137
A related criticism is that Prima Paint further undercuts the "at law or
equity" provision in derogation of a corollary to the "rule against surplus-
age"-that the legislature intends for each provision to add something to
the statutory scheme and does not want one provision to be applied in a
way that undercuts other provisions. Prima Paint's construction instead
effectively overrides the plain language and implication of the statute's
primary operative provision, rendering it effectively inoperative in
container contract situations.138
b. Logic is Fallacious
Another statutory critique is that the Court's interpretation is logically
fallacious for "begging the question." In particular, the major premise of
the Court's logical argument is that section 4's specific reference to "the
making of the agreement for arbitration" does not "permit" courts to
consider issues other than the agreement to arbitrate. 139 However, this
merely "begs the question," petitio principii, because it assumes the very
proposition that it states. When it states that section 4 does not "permit"
the courts to consider any other issues, it is assuming that there is no
other plausible interpretation of the "making" clause. 140 Yet, as the au-
thors of a prominent arbitration treatise observe, "[niothing would have
prevented the Court in Prima Paint from holding that the making of an
arbitration clause is in issue whenever the making of the agreement con-
taining it is in issue. '"141
c. Legislative History Ignored
Justice Black anchored his dissent in Prima Paint in the legislative his-
135. The Rule Against Surplusage generally holds that every word drafted into a stat-
ute is intended to have operative effect. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133 at 266-68.
136. The relevant part of section 2 is: "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1999) (emphasis added).
137. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
138. See ESKRIDGE E'r AL., supra note 133, at 263.
139. See supra note 69.
140. RUGGERIO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING 201-07 (1989).
141. MacNeil, supra note 27, § 15.2 n.13.
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tory of the FAA, 142 and those arguments still have force. While Congress
did not specifically address separability, the scant legislative record sug-
gests that the congressional subcommittees were led to understand that
agreements to arbitrate would be entered into on the basis of actual con-
sent, and that courts would decide whether the parties consented to arbi-
tration when questions of consent arose-including when arbitration
provisions were included in container contracts. 143
2. The Institutional Competence Critique
A rational rule for allocating decisional authority on the "who decides"
question might look to the relative institutional competencies of courts
and arbitrators. 44 Whether a contract has been formed is a quintessen-
tial question of law over which courts have long been recognized as hav-
ing special competence and experience. By contrast, the institutional
competence critique would contend that arbitrators have no special com-
petence to bring to the determination of questions of law. To the con-
trary, service as an arbitrator requires no legal training; one need not be a
lawyer or former judge to be a perfectly good arbitrator. Rather, the
arbitrator's institutional competence comes from other sources, such as
142. See, e.g., Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412-16 (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the Court's reluctance to interpret statutes (including the FAA) in light of their historical
context, see PAMELA S. KARLAN, DISARMING THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 20-26
(Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 36, 2002).
143. At a 1923 Senate subcommittee hearing, Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana
asked W.H.H. Piatt of the ABA: "If [a party] should attack it on the ground of fraud, to
rescind the whole thing... I presume that it [would] merely [be] (sic) a question of whether
he did make the arbitration agreement or not,... and then he would possibly set up that
he was misled about the contract and entered into it by mistake .... " Piatt deftly dodged
the question, and his failure to respond to or correct Walsh's express assumption that the
Court would consider contract defenses, specifically fraud, when an arbitration provision
was in a container contract may reasonably have left the impression that the stated as-
sumption was not incorrect. Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 13 (1923).
Such an impression would have been reinforced by the Act's primary drafter, Julius
Henry Cohen, when he assured the 1924 Joint Committee that the parties' constitutional
right to trial by jury remained intact under the Act, subject only to a voluntary waiver of
that right through a contractually valid agreement to arbitrate a dispute. Said Cohen "you
can waive that [jury trial right]. And you can do that in advance. Ah, but the question
whether you waive it or not depends on whether that is your signature to the paper, or
whether you authorized that signature, or whether the paper is a valid paper or not,
whether it was delivered properly." This is the language of actual consent to arbitration,
not implied consent or separability. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, Joint
Hearings before the Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 17 (1924).
144. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Howsam, in part relied upon the analysis of
institutional competence. See Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 592. Institutional competence analysis
derives from the "legal process school," which, inter alia, legitimized judicial review by
reference to the institutional competency of the courts. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING ANI) APPLICATION OF LAW, at li (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). For a modern take, see Edward L. Rubin, The
New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996), which states that "contemporary law and economics and




the sophistication of their understanding of the context in which the dis-
pute arose (including local and industry customs and practices), their per-
sonal stature as an authority to the disputing parties, as well as their
procedural knowledge of arbitration and the arbitration process's inher-
ent capacity for the efficient resolution of disputes. As a result, institu-
tional competence analysis would suggest that courts be allocated the
question of the formation of the container contract, and that interpreta-
tion questions be allocated to the arbitrator. As Justice Black recognized,
it seems especially odd, even "fantastic," to allocate to arbitrators the
legal question of whether a legal contract has been validly formed when
that arbitrator may not have the background or experience necessary to
make that determination. 145
3. The Contract Law Doctrinal Critique
A third critique is that Prima Paint separability perverts contract law
because it assumes away the fundamental principle of contractual con-
sent, thus impeding the applicability of affirmative defenses to the forma-
tion of a contract that would vitiate the enforceability of a contract
containing an agreement to arbitrate 146 and elevating arbitration provi-
sions in contracts above all other provisions.147 The effect is to "move[ ]
court access for common law claims from an inalienable right to one
more easily alienable than many other underlying rights."' 148
As Professor Ware has argued, separability's principle of implied con-
sent to arbitration is a "legal fiction" because the doctrine implies or im-
putes agreement to the "separated" arbitration agreement that may or
may not exist. 149 Says Ware:
Had a contract consisting of just the arbitration clause been
presented to the parties, they might have given their voluntary con-
sent to it. But, that is just speculation. And imposing duties based on
speculations about what the parties would have voluntarily con-
sented to is profoundly different from imposing duties based on what
145. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
146. See Stempel, supra note 131, at 1383-414.
147. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting).
148. Shell, supra note 131, at 456.
149. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTIRA L.
REV. 83, 131 (1996). Separability proponents might find some doctrinal comfort in Section
211(1) of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, "Standardized Agreements," which
generally provides for implied assent to all boilerplate terms not objected to in standard-
ized agreements. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). However, recog-
nizing the potential for overreaching and other abuses inherent in the unilateral imposition
of contractual terms through a standardized agreement, the drafters of the Restatement
also provided exceptions to mitigate that risk. Subsection 211(3) in particular provides that
a term would not be a part of the agreement "[w]here the other party has reason to believe
that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing con-
tained a particular term." Id. The Reporter's Comments lend support for the argument
that an arbitration provision waiving all legal rights and remedies is the very type of unan-
ticipated term contemplated by section 211(3). See id. cmt. f, illus. 7 (explaining that a




the parties did, in fact, voluntarily consent to. The former has no
place in contract law while the latter is the essence of contract law.' 50
4. The Ethics Critique
The heart of this criticism is self-interest, that there is something funda-
mentally improper about allocating the decisional authority over the va-
lidity of the container contract to a person or entity that would stand to
profit from that decision. In the public court system, it has long been
clear that personal profiteering from judicial authority offends the most
fundamental notions of due process. 15' While courts have yet to recog-
nize state action in arbitrations conducted under the Federal Arbitration
Act 52-a necessary predicate for enforceable due process standards-
professional and institutional ethical norms applicable to both arbitrators
and judges overwhelmingly reject the notion of adjudication by a decision
maker with a stake in the dispute without some form of meaningful, ac-
tual consent to waive the conflict of interest. 53
It seems beyond question that an arbitrator has a stake in the outcome
with respect to arbitrability decisions generally, including the separability
context in particular. If the decision favors arbitrability, the arbitrator
retains jurisdiction and the (often substantial) fees that can accompany
it.' 54 If the decision is against arbitrability, then jurisdiction is extin-
guished, as are the fees that accompany them. In the intense competition
for arbitration services, the reality is that arbitrability decisions can be
made not only by reference to the potential income for a single case, but
also for entire streams of later cases that may or may not be available to
the arbitrator depending upon the arbitrator's performance in a single
matter. 155
To be sure, the overwhelming majority of arbitrators must be presumed
to be people of integrity and good will, and the self-interest concern may
150. Ware, supra note 149.
151. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (finding that payment to a justice of
the peace who signs search warrants on a per-warrant-issued basis creates a sufficient pecu-
niary interest to establish bias for purposes of due process); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564 (1973) (showing that a state agency that regulates optometry and is also composed of
independent optometrists is biased in proceedings against optometrists who work for cor-
porations because they have a pecuniary interest in limiting entry into the field and exclud-
ing chain stores); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (finding that a defendant's due
process rights were violated when the local mayor presided over the trial where the defen-
dant was convicted for unlawful possession of liquor).
152. For arguments that arbitrations conducted under the FAA constitute "state ac-
tion," for purposes of due process, see Reuben, supra note 2.
153. See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canons I
and II (Rev. 1999); CODE OF PROF'L RESPONS1131LITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT DISI'UTES §§ 1, 2 (Rev. 2000), available at 1999 WL 1627991.
154. See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Stat-
utory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. Sr. U. L. REV. 293, 307 (1999) (observing that the
view that arbitration is inexpensive is not necessarily accurate, given some estimates that
arbitrators' fees average $700 per day).




be no greater in the separability context than in other arbitrability con-
texts. However, the fact is that the arbitrator has a stake in the outcome
when deciding arbitrability-including the validity of the container con-
tract-and that creates at least the perception of a conflict of interest that
would not inure to the container contract problem if container contract
validity was decided by the courts. 156
5. The Pragmatism Critique
The separability doctrine may also be criticized on pragmatic grounds
that tend to reflect the workability of the doctrine in light of other criti-
cisms. 157 In advancing this critique, Professor Sternlight has underscored
the difficulty of disentangling a party's assent to the arbitration provision
from the assent to the container contract, and has questioned why some-
one intending to defraud another would focus on the arbitration provi-
sion rather than "something big like the price or quality of the goods or
services at issue.' 158 Moreover, even assuming one is able to identify
fraud that is directed at an arbitration provision that would permit judi-
cial access, it is difficult to disentangle that fraud from any fraud that
might also involve the container contract, and the so-called "national pol-
icy favoring arbitration" counsels courts to defer such mixed cases to ar-
bitrators rather than decide them at law.
159
6. The Rule of Law Critique
The rule of law critique focuses on the reasonable expectations of par-
ties to their "day in court" for the resolution of legal disputes, and on how
the doctrine of separability frustrates those expectations by routing the
merits of disputes over the formation of the container contract to
arbitrators.160
Legal scholars have long recognized that the expectation of one's "day
in court" is a fundamental tenet of the American justice system.' 61 Peo-
156. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (hold-
ing arbitrators under the FAA to the same standards of neutrality and impartiality as Arti-
cle III judges).
157. See supra notes 132-56 and accompanying text.
158. Sternlight, supra note 131, at 100 n.87.
159. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
160. The "day in court" expectation is a socially learned construct that the law has
come to respect through a variety of mechanisms, such as the doctrines of unconscionabil-
ity and reasonable expectations, and in variety of contexts. See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LAW OF
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.09 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2002). For a more extensive
discussion in the arbitration context, see Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Res-
olution: The Problem With Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter/
Spring 2004).
161. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1167 (2001) (citing, inter alia, RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A
MATTrER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 73 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litiga-
tion Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1177
("However articulated, defended, or accounted for, the sense of legal rights as claims




ple reasonably expect to have a court decide whether they have been
fraudulently or otherwise unlawfully induced into signing a contract. In
particular, they reasonably expect to be able to assert their legal chal-
lenges to the enforceability of the contract before a court of law, they
reasonably expect the court to apply the law to their dispute, and they
reasonably expect that a court of appeals will be available to correct any
errors of law. Yet for many contracting parties, particularly consumers
and workers, the first time they learn of the arbitration provision is when
they try to assert their claims in a court of law and are met with a respon-
sive FAA section 4 motion to compel the arbitration. 162 Arguments over
the equality of the arbitral forum aside, 63 an arbitration proceeding is
not a court of law. For some litigants, to be deprived of one's day in court
is bad enough, but to be thrust into a forum in which standard contract
defenses have no legal force may be even more disconcerting.
As I have discussed elsewhere, 64 emerging trust theory would suggest
that such a dissonant experience may diminish the affected person's level
of trust in the courts and the rule of law as an institution. 65 Trust gener-
ally is a function of met expectations, and with respect to legal institu-
tions, the empirical research has consistently shown that the willingness
to comply voluntarily with legal rules is dependent upon the perceived
fairness of the process by which the rule was created and applied.' 66 Sep-
arability calls that notion of perceived fairness into question by defeating
one's expectation that a legal dispute arising out of a transaction will be
decided by a court of law, unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably"
agree to use a different process.
Trust in the courts is one of the most precious elements of the social
capital of our legal system. 167 Continuing to sacrifice that capital on sep-
arability's altar of judicial efficiency is a high price to pay for a doctrine
with little other credible justification.
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIMA PAINT SEPARABILITY
While the foregoing critiques raise serious questions about the veracity
of Prima Paint's rule of separability, few would quarrel with its signifi-
cance. Prima Paint substantially enhanced the authority of arbitrators by
162. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 940-41.
163. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 606-08; Carrington & Haagen, supra note 46, at 649.
164. See Reuben, supra note 160 and sources cited therein.
165. The concept of trust has been analyzed from a variety of different scholarly disci-
plines. For an attempt to categorize the streams of trust research flowing from psychology,
sociology, political science, anthropology, history, and sociobiology, see P. Worchel, Trust
and Distrust, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 174-87 (W.G.
Austin & S. Worchel, eds., 1979).
166. See Reuben, supra note 160 (citing TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990)).
167. See Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR: 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better
Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93, 97 (2002). For a discussion of trust in courts, see
TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). For a compilation of research on trust
and government more generally, see VALERIE BRAITHWAITE & MARGARET LEVI, EDS.,
TRUST & GOVERNANCE (1998).
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allocating to them questions over the validity of container contracts, and
it is for this reason that some have argued that Prima Paint's central im-
portance has been to incorporate a version of kompetenz-kompetenz into
American arbitration law. 168 Moreover, many courts have extended sep-
arability beyond the fraud context to include other defenses to contract
formation in the federal courts such as mistake, illegality, and frustration
of purpose. 169 However, in so doing, Prima Paint has also significantly
restricted the ability of parties to have the merits of their disputes de-
cided according to the rule of law, as discussed further below.170 It has
also generated enormous confusion and uncertainty, as both state and
federal courts have wrestled with its implications for access to justice, and
the fundamental tension, in particular cases before them. 71
1. The Introduction of Implied Consent Theory
Beyond the mechanical doctrine of separability, Prima Paint also laid
the foundation for a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases that inherently
endorse what may be described as a principle of implied consent to arbi-
tration.1 72 Indeed, while not stated in Prima Paint, it is this principle of
implied consent-or, more accurately, imputed consent-to arbitration
that gives separability any analytical coherence under contract law. After
all, the "separated" arbitration "contract" recognized by separability is
not created according to traditional contract formation principles of man-
ifestation of independent assent and consideration.1 73 Rather, separabil-
ity imputes assent and consideration from the container contract to the
"separated" contract for arbitration by virtue of the construction of the
FAA, not by the conduct of the parties.1 74 That is to say, by assenting to
the terms of the container contract, a party is also implied by law to have
assented to the terms of the arbitration provision that is the subject of the
second contract; the assent and consideration supporting the larger
container contract is imputed to the separated "arbitration contract." It
is this imputed consent that makes it theoretically possible for the arbitra-
168. See William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Proce-
dural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv. 647, 709 n.101 (1989) (stating
that separability "serves a function related to that of competence/competence").
169. See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, § 15.3.2 and cases cited therein; see also Bess
v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting illegality exception to Prima
Paint); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 824 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(same).
170. See infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
172. Professor Stempel has been a leading proponent of a vigorous requirement of con-
sent to arbitration, and a critic of its decline. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 49, 1381-407;
Stempel, supra note 131, at 1383-90.
173. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 204-05 (3d ed. 1990).
174. Some courts have been willing to find implied consent to arbitrate arising from the
conduct of the parties, although the theoretical construct I am proposing here is somewhat
different in that it describes the legal fiction of separability, rather than the actions of a
particular party. See, e.g., Pervel Indus., Inc. v. T M Wallcovering, Inc., 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1989). See generally 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, § 17.3.1.3.
20031
SMU LAW REVIEW
tion provision to survive as an independent contract when the larger con-
tract that contains it is found to be defective by an arbitrator.
Perhaps unwittingly, the Supreme Court has built upon this foundation
of implied consent in a series of FAA cases upholding predispute arbitra-
tion provisions. 175 Most notably in a pair of cases in the late 1980s involv-
ing Shearson/American Express,1 76 the Court reversed its own precedent
barring the waiver of the judicial forum, Wilko v. Swan,1 77 and upheld the
enforceability of predispute arbitration provisions against claims that
such provisions should not be enforced because they are included in con-
tracts of adhesion. 78 The Court's decision to reverse Wilko recognized
that the FAA permitted the waiver of the judicial forum, and while the
opinion speaks in terms of furthering the "national policy favoring arbi-
tration," the Court's willingness to enforce a predispute arbitration provi-
sion necessarily reflects an operating assumption that a waiver of judicial
access rights may be implied or imputed from the larger container con-
tract at issue. 179 After all, the nature of the claim that the Court rejected
in the Shearson cases was that there was no actual consent. 180 The Court
later extended this principle significantly in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane,' 8' a major decision permitting the implied waiver of court access
even for statutory discrimination claims through predispute arbitration
provisions in employment contracts of adhesion. 8 2
2. The Contraction of Access to Justice
The expansion of separability and its related principle of implied con-
sent to arbitration has had the effect of contracting access to justice with
respect to the validity of both the arbitration provision and the larger
container contract.
At the level of the larger container contract-the primary substantive
concern for most parties-the rule of separability makes it virtually im-
possible for a party to have a fraud, mistake, or other contract formation
175. For concise discussions, see Carrington & Haagen, supra note 46, at 363-79; Stem-
pel, supra note 49, at 1408-17; and Sternlight, supra note 47, at 644-74.
176. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
177. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
178. See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223-24.
179. See Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481; accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1984) (stating that "although the parties' intentions con-
trol ... those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability"); Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (holding that "[a]s a
matter of federal law, any doubts ... should be resolved in favor of arbitration").
180. Indeed, in the Shearson cases, rather than require actual consent to arbitration, the
Court shifted the burden to the plaintiff "to show that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 227.
181. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Gilmer case generated, and continues to generate, a storm
of controversy far too extensive to discuss here. For a sampling of perspectives, see Rich-
ard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 979 n.131 (2000).
182. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
[Vol. 56
CONSENT TO ARBITRATION
challenge to that underlying contract heard and decided by a court of law,
according to the rule of law.183 By definition, separability requires such
challenges to be heard by the arbitrator, who may but need not necessa-
rily apply such rules. 184
Similarly, at the narrower level of the arbitration provision itself, the
rule of separability makes it highly unlikely that the enforcement of the
"separated" arbitration contract will be defeated by a formation-based
challenge, apart from unconscionability or other public policy de-
fenses.' 85 Rare is the case in which a party seeking to avoid arbitration
will be able to point to a deformity of contract formation that is directed
exclusively at the arbitration clause and not at all to the larger container
contract. For this reason, despite the express language of the FAA, and
despite the presumably millions of arbitrations conducted under its au-
thority since its enactment in 1925,186 there are few reported cases invali-
dating arbitration agreements on traditional contract grounds other than
unconscionability. 187 Rather, the formation challenges to the underlying
transaction are rarely heard and decided under the law, as one's "day in
court" never, in fact, arrives. 188
The net effect of separability is to remove from the public courts, and
the public law, an untolled but potentially vast number of cases involving
validity challenges to contracts that include an arbitration provision-a
trend likely to continue because of the continuing push toward form con-
tracts189 and the inclusion of arbitration provisions in those contracts.1 90
183. See generally Stempel, supra note 131.
184. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
185. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Gra-
ham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). For a discussion with extensive case
citations, see F. PAUL BLAND, JR., ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CON-
SUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS §§ 4.1-4.4 (2001).
186. The 2001 case load for the AAA alone was 218,000-capping seven years of case-
load expansion. See Annual Report, American Arbitration Association 1 (2001).
187. 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 27, § 19.2.1; WARE, supra note 27, § 2.24. Of
course, unconscionability defenses inherently are directed at the arbitration provision, not
the container contract, although they may relate to the similar claims directed at the
container contract.
188. I do not mean to suggest that all arbitrators necessarily operate lawlessly. Surely
many (if not most) arbitrators are conscientious, and may well look to legal standards to
guide their judgment. Rather my point is simply that they have no obligation to apply those
standards unless the parties so specify in their submission to arbitration, or unless man-
dated by the arbitral rules under which the proceeding is taking place. To be clearer, I see
this as a benefit of arbitration, in that it unchains the decision maker from the rigidities of
legal rules, and therefore is a strong reason to choose arbitration as a dispute resolution
process in an appropriate case.
189. For an argument that efficiency interests will continue to push contract formation
toward standardization, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Inno-
vation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713
(1997).
190. For a discussion of the growing popularity of contractual arbitration, set in the
context of an argument in favor of increased regulatory oversight of arbitrators, see Cam-
eron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need For
Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337-41 (2002), and sources cited therein.
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3. The Legacy of Doctrinal Confusion
This is a harsh result, and one that appeals to the rule-of-law side of the
fundamental tension, for the rule-of-law values that were embraced in the
legislative compromise in the FAA do not square easily with the notion
that one may be completely cut off from the possibility of having one's
dispute decided according to the rule of law. This dissonance is felt in the
tortured case law that has followed Prima Paint in both federal and state
courts.
The lower federal courts are of course obligated to follow Prima Paint's
rule of separability, although clearly they have done so with varying de-
grees of fidelity.1 91 State courts, however, are not similarly bound by the
so-called "Federal Rule,"1 92 and the picture we see in those decisions is
much more troublesome. 93 In this regard, conventional wisdom holds
that separability is also the majority rule in the states, 194 and it is indeed
technically accurate to say that a majority of states have enacted "some
form" of separability. 95 However, closer analysis reveals a much deeper
level of reticence in the states, likely reflecting both the fundamental ten-
sion as well as other substantive problems with separability. 196 Instead, it
is clear that the states do not view separability as a rule of such over-
whelming normative desirability as to compel unanimity.
As a matter of common law, just over half of the states and the District
of Columbia-28 jurisdictions-have clearly adopted some form of the
separability doctrine. 97 However, only 17 of them have adopted it with-
out limitation, 9 while 11 others have adopted separability only in lim-
191. See infra note 202 for federal appellate cases limiting separability to void contracts
and situations alleging ineffective assent.
192. 1 DOMKE, supra note 12, § 8.02. While Prima Paint is binding on federal courts(albeit narrowed by several), state courts have been much more reticent about adopting
separability. See infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
193. Reasonable questions may be raised about whether state court decisions that are
inconsistent with Prima Paint are preempted by that decision under Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and related cases. However, because of the complexity of their
analysis, they are beyond the scope of this article. Rather, I assume these state court rul-
ings are valid and not preempted by the FAA.
194. See Stone, supra note 122, at 516; 1 DOMKE, supra note 12, § 8.02.
195. See UNIF. ARBIrRATION Acr § 6(d) cmt. 4 (2000).
196. See supra notes 131-67 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 198-99.
198. The seventeen states (including the District of Columbia) that have adopted Prima
Paint without limitation are: Alabama (Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So.2d 1258
(Ala. 1994)); Arizona (Flower World v. Wenzel, 594 P.2d 1015 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978));
Connecticut (Two Sisters, Inc. v. Gosch & Co., 370 A.2d 1020 (Conn. 1976.)); Delaware(Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., No. 8738, 1987 WL 13520 (Del. Ch.
July 7, 1987)); District of Columbia (Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916(D.C. 1992)); Hawaii (Lee v. Heftel, 911 P.2d 721 (Haw. 1996)); Illinois (Aste v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 728 N.E.2d 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)); Iowa (Dacres v. John Deere Ins. Co.,
548 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1996)); Massachusetts (Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 475
N.E.2d 1208 (Mass. 1980)); Michigan (Scanlon v. P & J Enters., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 616
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990)); Montana (Mueske v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 859 P.2d 444(Mont. 1993)); Nevada (Sentry Systems, Inc. v. Guy, 654 P.2d 1008 (Nev. 1982)); Penn-
sylvania (Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 331 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1975)); South
Carolina (South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great W. Coal, 437 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1993));
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ited form.199 For example, a common approach to constraining
separability has been to limit its application to situations in which the
claim is that the container contract is voidable 200 and not applying sepa-
rability to situations in which the claim is that the container contract is
void 20' or non-existent.20 2 Other courts have limited separability to the
Texas (Gerwell v. Moran, 10 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.)); Virginia
(Ryan Med., Inc. v. Univ. of Va. Alumni Patents Found., No. LR-3818-1, 1990 WL 751070
Va. Cir. Ct. Feb 21, 1990)); and Washington (Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751
(Wash. Ct. App. 1973)). It should be noted that the rulings from seven of these jurisdictions
are not from the courts of last resort in their states, meaning that the issue has not been
finally decided in those states, and could go the other way, opposing or limiting separabil-
ity. Those states are Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington.
199. The eleven states that have adopted Prima Paint in limited form are: California
(Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061 (Cal. 1996)); Colorado (R.P.T., Inc.
v. Innovative Communications., 917 P.2d 340 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)); Austin v. U.S. West,
Inc., 926 P.2d 181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)); Georgia (Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538
S.E.2d 73, 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)); Indiana (Goebel v. Blocks & Marbles Brand Toys, Inc.,
568 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)); Kansas (City of Wamego v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co.,
675 P.2d 912 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)); Louisiana (George Engine Co. v. S. Shipbuilding
Corp., 376 So. 2d 1040 (La. Ct. App. 1979)); Maryland (Holmes v. Coverall N. Am., Inc.,
633 A.2d 932 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)); Minnesota (Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of
Am., 197 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1972)); New York (Teleserve Sys. Inc. v. MCI Telcomms.
Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1997)); North Dakota (Country Kitchen of Mount Vernon, Inc. v.
Country Kitchen of W. Am., Inc., 293 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1980)); and Ohio (Weiss v. Voice/
Fax Corp., 640 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)).
200. "Voidable" contracts are those "where one party was an infant, or where the con-
tract was induced by fraud, mistake, or duress, or where breach of a warranty or other
promise justifies the aggrieved party in putting an end to the contract." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. b (1981).
201. "Void" contracts are those which, when breached, "the law neither gives a remedy
nor otherwise recognizes a duty of performance by the promisor." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) CONTRACrS § 7 cmt. a (1981). These will typically include contracts that the law will
not enforce as a matter of policy (i.e., because it deals with an illegal subject matter).
202. With "non-existent contracts," often called "void" contracts, the nature of the
claim is that there never was an agreement to arbitrate because the party sought to be
compelled into arbitration was not a party to a contract with an arbitration provision. See,
e.g., Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the question of whether a particular individual has authority to bind a party must be
determined by the court, not by an arbitrator).
Courts in this regard often appear to further limit the application of the separability
doctrine by favoring findings of voidness or non-existence rather than voidability to permit
the courts to retain jurisdiction over the dispute. See, e.g., Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist.
v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that separability is
"limited to challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a contract-not to challenges going to
the very existence of a contract that a party claims never to have agreed to"); Jolley v.
Welch, 904 F.2d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's referral of dispute to a
magistrate where there was a possibility of forgery of signatures on the contract containing
the arbitration provision); Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998,
1000 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "where the allegation is one of... ineffective assent to
the contract, the issue [of arbitrability] is not subject to resolution pursuant to an arbitra-
tion clause contained in the contract documents"); Nature's 10 Jewelers v. Gunderson, 648
N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 2002) (holding that the arbitration provision in a franchise contract was
not enforceable because the franchise registration had expired, leaving the contract void);
Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Hill, 539 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that the right to
arbitrate is waived when not asserted in responsive pleading and the allegation is that the
contract is void). But see Timberton Golf, L.P. v. McCumber Constr., Inc., 788 F. Supp.
919, 924-25 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (compelling an arbitration clause despite finding that the
underlying contract was void). For a general discussion, see Steven Walt, Decision by Divi-
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narrow "fraud in the inducement" context in which it arose in Prima
Paint.20 3 Still others have simply decided the dispute before them on
other grounds.204 In addition, three states have mixed authority, but may
fairly be characterized as having adopted a limited form of Prima
Paint.205
On the other hand, however, twenty-three states have either refused to
adopt the separability doctrine or have no authority on it at all. Nine
states have refused to adopt it at common law, deliberately rejecting sep-
arability in appellate rulings,20 6 while fourteen of the twenty-three states
have issued no authority on the question in the nearly thirty-five years
that Prima Paint has been the law.2 0 7
Finally, state legislatures have expressed little interest in codifying
Prima Paint, although the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA)
would codify it in states in which the RUAA is adopted.20 8 While virtu-
ally all states have enacted general arbitration statutes,2°9 only three ar-
guably even address separability-New Jersey,2t 0 New York,21' and
sion: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 369
(1999).
203. California is a good example. See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d
1061 (Cal. 1996).
204. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir.
2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (decided on other grounds).
205. The three states that have mixed authority, both appearing to reject and to adopt
Prima Paint in at least limited form are: California, compare Erickson, Arbuthnot, McCar-
thy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1983) (following Prima
Paint), with Rosenthal, 926 P.2d 1061 (Cal. 1996) (limiting Prima Paint to claims of fraud in
the inducement); Louisiana, compare George Engine Co. v. S. Shipbuilding Corp., 376 So.
2d 1040 (La. Ct. App. 1979), with TRCM v. Twilight P'shp, 706 So.2d 1037 (La. Ct. App.
1998); and Ohio, compare Weiss v. Voice/Fax Corp., 640 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994),
with Duryee v. Rogers, No. 98AP-1255, No. 98AP-1256, 1999 WL 744341 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 1999). Because of the nature of the contrast as being between appellate and su-
preme courts, or because of the weight of lower court rulings in a particular direction, I
further categorize all three states-California, Louisiana, and Ohio-as having adopted
Prima Paint in limited form. See supra note 199.
206. The nine states rejecting Prima Paint are: Florida (Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton,
751 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)); Kentucky (Marks v. Bean, 57 S.W.3d 303 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2001)); New Hampshire (Pittsfield Weaving Co., Inc. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430
A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981)); New Jersey (Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 749 A.2d 405
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000) (but see infra note 210 for statutory authority authorizing parties to
adopt separability by contract)); New Mexico (Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 698 P.2d 880
(N.M. 1985)); North Carolina (Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group Leasing Co., 316
S.E.2d 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)); Oklahoma (Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996));
South Dakota (Nature's 10 Jewelers v. Gunderson, 648 N.W.2d 812 (S.D. 2002)); and Ten-
nessee (Frizzell Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79 (Tenn. 1999)).
207. The 14 states without common-law authority on Prima Paint are: Alaska, Arkan-
sas, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
208. UNIr. ARITRATION AC § 6(c) (Rev. 2000).
209. For a full listing of these state statutes, see Reuben, supra note 181, at 976 n.108.
210. See N.J. STrA-. ANN. § 2A:23A-5 (West 2000) (explicitly providing arbitrator with
jurisdiction over questions of whether the dispute is covered by the arbitration provision,
and whether the whole contract was induced by fraud, while exempting fraudulent induce-
ment claims directed at the arbitration provision).
211. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1998). The statute does not discuss the doc-
trine, but the "Practice Commentary" following the statute does. The commentary cites a
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Utah.212 Even then, none of those states appears to adopt separability
legislatively; to the contrary, Utah's ambiguous statute may more easily
be read to reject Prima Paint.2 13
IV. A RAY OF LIGHT: FIRST OPTIONS, HOWSAM, AND AN
APPARENT CHANGE OF COURSE
Despite the many state and federal decisions limiting separability, for
years Prima Paint has stood as a towering landmark. However, the rise of
the ADR movement in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and its
apparent embrace of implied consent to arbitrability, brought the issue of
arbitrability back to the Court in First Options in 1995, and, more re-
cently, in Howsam in 2002, and to a lesser extent PacificCare in 2003.214
The analysis in the more recent cases suggests that the Court may be
charting a different, simpler course on FAA arbitrability as a whole by
making clear that courts, not arbitrators, are to decide questions of arbi-
trability, by clearly distinguishing what is (and what is not) a question of
arbitrability, and by further articulating a presumption that an arbitration
provision's silence on the "who decides" question should be construed as
an intent of the parties for courts to retain jurisdiction to decide arbi-
trability. This development has potentially serious implications for the
doctrine of separability, for it brings to the surface a fissure deeply em-
bedded in the Supreme Court's case law over the nature of assent re-
quired to establish an agreement to arbitrate.
A. FIRST OPTIONS V. KAPLAN
1. The Dispute
First Options arose with the stock market crash of 1987.215 Manual
Kaplan was a private stock trader doing business through MKI, a com-
pany that Kaplan and, apparently, his wife, Carol, solely owned. First
Options was a "clearing firm" that handled MKI's trades on the floor of
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 21 6 When the markets crashed on Octo-
ber 19, 1987, MKI lost more than $12 million, leaving a deficit of $2.1
number of cases, including Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, (N.Y. 1973), for the proposi-
tion that New York consistently follows the Prima Pbint doctrine. See Vincent C. Alexan-
der, Practice Commentaries to § 7501, C7501:4, Threshold Questions: What Issues Did the
Parties Agree to Arbitrate? (McKinney 1998). For a case reaching an opposite result, see
Teleserve System, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997).
212. U'AH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-3 (1996). It provides: "A written agreement to submit
any existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, ex-
cept upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. (emphasis added).
213. Id. Indeed, fraud is the only specifically listed exception to the general rule that
arbitration agreements are enforceable if valid as a matter of contract.
214. See supra note 35.
215. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940.
216. Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., 19 F.3d 1503, 1506 (3d Cir. 1993).
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million in its First Options account. 217 First Options sought recovery
from both MKI and from the Kaplans personally. A series of disputes
followed, which finally led to a work-out agreement consisting of four
documents and a continuing relationship between MKI and Kaplan.218
That relationship continued to be contentious, however, and in 1989
First Options submitted all of its disputes with Kaplan to an arbitration
panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, pursuant to a broad arbitra-
tion provision in one of the four work-out documents. 219 MKI accepted
arbitration, but the Kaplans filed written objections to the arbitration of
the First Options's claims against them personally, contending that those
documents did not include an arbitration provision and that the Kaplans
therefore had not agreed to arbitrate those disputes.220 The Kaplans par-
ticipated in a pre-hearing discovery conference in 1990, but their new
counsel failed to renew the Kaplans' objection to the arbitration panel's
jurisdiction.221 There was no progress on the case until 1992, when the
Kaplans, again represented by new counsel, renewed their objection in a
motion to dismiss the personal claims against them. The arbitration panel
rejected the motion without comment, and finally entered an award total-
ing more than $6 million against the Kaplans and MKI, jointly and
severally. 222
The Kaplans filed a petition to vacate the award against them person-
ally in federal district court under section 10 of the FAA. The court re-
jected that claim and instead granted First Options's cross-motion to
confirm the award, apparently ruling that the Kaplans had generally con-
sented to the arbitration by virtue of the arbitration provision in the one
work-out document, and that they had waived their objections to arbitral
jurisdiction by participating in the 1990 discovery conference. 223 The
Kaplans appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
which affirmed the award against MKI but reversed the award against the
Kaplans personally.224
217. Id.
218. The four work-out agreement documents were: (1) a Letter Agreement executed
by First Options, MKI, Mr. Kaplan, Mrs. Kaplan, and certain other entities and individuals;
(2) a Guaranty executed only by MKI; (3) a Subordinated Loan Agreement executed by
First Options, MKI, and a separate entity; and (4) a Subordinated Promissory Note exe-
cuted by MKI. Id.
219. The arbitration clause in the Subordinated Loan Agreement provided in relevant
part:
"[Any controversy arising out of or relating to this [Subordinated Loan]
Agreement, the Letter Agreement, the Subordinated Notes or any other
document referred to herein or therein or the breach thereof shall be submit-
ted to and settled by arbitration pursuant to the Constitution and Rules of
the Exchange. The parties hereto and all who may claim under them shall be
conclusively bound by such arbitration."
Id. at 1507 n.5.
220. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
221. Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1508.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1510-23.
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2. The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit ruling in
a decision that was framed in terms of the standards of judicial review for
arbitration awards. 225 Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the Court, said
there were two related issues: whether reviewing courts should give de
novo review to arbitrator decisions on the arbitrability of a dispute, and
whether appellate courts should give de novo or deferential review to
district court rulings on motions to vacate an award under section 10 of
the FAA.226
a. Scope
The Court focused its opinion primarily on the first issue. Breyer em-
phasized the narrow nature of the issue the Court was deciding, noting
that there were three types of disagreements at issue in the Kaplan dis-
pute: (1) the disagreement about whether the Kaplans were personally
liable (the merits), (2) the disagreement about whether they had agreed
to arbitrate that dispute (the arbitrability of the dispute), and (3) the disa-
greement over who would decide whether there was an agreement to ar-
bitrate (who decides arbitrability).227 Breyer made clear that the Court
was only considering the third question, the "who decides" question. For
the sake of clarity and accessibility, I shall refer to this typology of disa-
greement as Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III questions.
b. The Rule Announced
The Court said the answer to the Tier III "who decides" question was
"fairly simple" when considered in light of the first principles of the FAA:
that an agreement to arbitrate is first and foremost a contract to waive
one's presumptive right to access courts and the law. Breyer wrote:
Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute ... so the ques-
tion "who has the primary power to decide arbitrability" turns upon
whether the parties agreed to submit that question to arbitration. If
so, then the court should defer to the arbitrator's arbitrability deci-
sion. If not, then the court should decide the question independently.
These two answers flow inexorably from the fact that arbitration is
simply a matter of contract between the parties. 228
225. The Court's "standard of review" frame is odd, but significant. The reasoning of
the attorneys for First Options may have been strategic, to take advantage of the heavy
judicial presumption against review of arbitral decisions. Moreover, the effect of the Third
Circuit's decision was to create a conflict with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Robbins v.
Day, 954 F.2d 679, 681-82 (11th Cir. 1992), thus increasing the likelihood of Supreme Court
review, especially given the unexceptional merits of the Third Circuit's opinion.
226. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
227. Id. at 942. This structure is consistent with the structure used in this article. See
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 943.
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In other words, the answer to the Tier III "who decides" question is
found in the contract. If the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to
submit the Tier II arbitrability question to the arbitrator, then courts
should generally honor that intent with deferential review of an arbitra-
tor's ruling that there is an agreement to arbitrate. If that intent is not
clear and unmistakable, however, the courts should not give deference to
an arbitrator's ruling on this issue.
c. Presumptions in Applying the Rule
Crucially, the Court's opinion emphasized certain presumptions that
govern the application of the rule. 229 The most significant presumption is
that if the agreement to arbitrate is silent on arbitrability, "[clourts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless
there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did S0."'230 That is,
when considering a Tier III "who decides" question, the operating as-
sumption is that courts are to decide if there is a valid agreement to arbi-
trate (the Tier II question) unless the parties have "clearly and
unmistakably" manifested their intent to have arbitrators decide that
question.
This was a deliberate step for the Court, extending beyond the collec-
tive bargaining context an important precedent establishing the "clear
and unmistakable" requirement for labor arbitrations, AT&T Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Communications Workers.231 While this extension did not
create a new rule of law per se, the Court recognized that its application
to a new context would have a ripple effect on the law of that new con-
text, and took care to address those consequences. In particular, the
Court recognized that the AT&T Technologies presumption of judicial
determination "reverses"2 32 the more familiar presumption that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration" that the Court had articulated in the oft-cited Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.2 3 3
However, the Court reasoned that it is "understandable" that the law
have different presumptions for situations in which there are questions
regarding the scope of an arbitration agreement and for situations in
which the question is whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate at
all.234 In the scope context, ambiguity should cut in favor of arbitrability
because "the parties likely gave at least some thought to the scope of
arbitration. And, given the law's permissive policies in respect to arbitra-
229. For an argument that this portion of First Options, and indeed, that much of the
opinion is dicta, see Rau, supra note 32, at 287-303. For a more thorough discussion, see
infra notes 322-33 and accompanying text.
230. Id.
231. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (citing AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Communications Work-
ers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)); see also Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 583.
232. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
233. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), cited in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1984).
234. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
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tion as seen in Moses H. Cone, one can understand why the law would
insist upon clarity before concluding that the parties did not want to arbi-
trate a related matter (issues will be deemed arbitrable unless 'it is clear
that the arbitration clause has not included' them). 12 35 By contrast, the
validity context is guided by "the principle that a party can be forced to
arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitra-
tion, [so] one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret si-
lence or ambiguity on the 'who should decide arbitrability' point as giving
the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too often force unwilling
parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge,
not an arbitrator, would decide. '236
d. The Application of the Rule
The Court's application of the rule and related presumptions suggests
an equally important trajectory for future doctrines that appear to be
confirmed in Howsam, as the Court said First Options could not show
that the Kaplans "clearly and unmistakably" agreed to arbitrate the "who
decides" issue. In this regard, two points are particularly significant.
First, the Court rejected First Options's argument that a "clear and un-
mistakable" agreement to arbitrate could be inferred from the Kaplans'
participation in the arbitration after having filed the written objection to
the arbitrator's jurisdiction.237 Rather, as a matter of law, the Court said
that merely arguing the jurisdiction issue to an arbitrator does not fairly
imply a willingness to be bound by the arbitrator's decision on that
issue. 238
This aspect of the Court's holding is particularly important because it
seems to support the suggestion that a judicial interpretation of "clear
and unmistakable" waiver cannot be based on implied consent, as Prima
Paint and following cases had permitted.239 Indeed, the justices' vigorous
questioning of counsel for First Options during oral arguments focused
almost exclusively on the propriety of First Options' argument that the
Kaplans' actual intent to arbitrate the arbitrability issue could be implied
from their conduct, specifically their participation in the arbitration. 240
By stark contrast, no questions or comments from the justices suggested
support on the Court for the concept of implied consent to arbitrate at
235. Id. at 945.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 946.
238. In this regard, the Court noted that the law of the circuit indicated that the
Kaplans could argue the arbitrability issue without losing their right to appeal on that
ground. Moreover, under these facts, the Kaplans were still bound to arbitrate the MKI
disputes, so declining to participate was not an option. Id.
239. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
240. Transcript of Oral Argument at *4-28, 53-54, First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938 (1995) (No. 94-560), available at 1995 WL 242250. "[Counsel for First Op-
tions:] I think everyone in this case agrees that the parties are entitled to allow the arbitra-
tors to decide the issue of arbitrability. The only question is how they do that, or how they




least Tier III arbitrability. The Court's unanimous decision to require
"clear and unmistakable" intent to arbitrate the Tier III "who decides"
issue seems to speak for itself.
Second, the Court expressly rejected efficiency-based arguments as a
basis for finding that the Kaplans agreed to arbitrate, requiring instead
individualized contractual analysis. As did many successful litigants
before them, First Options strongly advanced a policy argument that the
FAA's "national policy favoring arbitration" should lead to a presump-
tion that the Kaplans agreed to arbitrate the "who decides" question. 241
The effect of this argument would have been to establish a judicial policy
that would have allocated disputes over the "who decides" issue to arbi-
trators, subject to deferential review by the courts, ostensibly to further
the oft-cited individual and institutional interests in preventing "delay
and waste in the resolution of disputes. ' 242 Remarkably, given its recent
no-holds-barred jurisprudence of Gilmer and Allied Bruce Terminex v.
Dobson,2 43 the Court dismissed that argument as "legally erroneous ....
After all, the basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the
quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties' wishes, but to en-
sure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are en-
forced according to their terms. '2 44
The Court's unanimous and explicit willingness to reject an analysis
that would have promoted judicial economy in favor of an admittedly
less-efficient individualized analysis is consistent with, and even under-
scores, the importance that the Court appears to be attaching to the re-
quirement of an actual agreement to arbitrate the "who decides"
question. This conclusion, as the Court itself stressed, "flow[s] inexorably
from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the
parties. '245 In other words, the national policy regarding arbitration is
not one favoring arbitration as an institution, but rather one that seeks to
preserve the rights of individual parties to contract for the arbitration of
disputes if they so desire. 246
3. The Return to Actual Consent Theory?
The Court's decision in First Options was its most significant on arbi-
trability since Prima Paint, and in this respect it is equally significant that
241. Id. First Options's argument that the Kaplans had agreed to arbitrate was based
exclusively on the Kaplans' participation in the arbitration proceeding. See Brief for the
Petitioner at 14-16, First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (No. 94-560).
242. First Options, 514 U.S. at 946.
243. 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that the term "commerce" in the FAA is to be given
its broadest possible construction). Justice Breyer's opinion in Allied-Bruce was released in
January 1995, before the May 1995 release of First Options.
244. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947 (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 943.
246. For further discussion of the "national policy" regarding arbitration see Sternlight,
supra note 11, in which the author argues that the Supreme Court's expressed preference
for binding arbitration is unsupported by the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration
Act and is also unwise as a matter of policy.
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the decision was unanimous, without even a concurring opinion to sug-
gest a hint of dissent.247
At the core, First Options operates from a very different theoretical
basis than Prima Paint. Where the underlying theory of Prima Paint is
one of implied consent, the underlying theory of First Options is one of
actual consent. In this regard, First Options builds upon a line of cases
pre-dating Prima Paint, beginning with United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,248 in which the Court emphasized a
union's voluntary choice in negotiating an arbitration provision in a col-
lective bargaining agreement. The Court upheld the validity of the arbi-
tration provision,249 but also recognized that "arbitration is a matter of
contract, and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dis-
pute which he has not agreed to so submit. '250 The Court expanded upon
Warrior & Gulf in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,
making it clear that "whether the parties agreed to arbitrate" is "undenia-
bly an issue for judicial determination ... unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise."'251 In so doing, the Court reversed an
appellate court ruling ordering the parties to arbitrate Tier III
arbitrability.252
First Options extends this line of cases, and their "clear and unmistaka-
ble" requirement, beyond the collective bargaining context and into the
realm of contractual arbitrations covered by the FAA.253 Thus, under
First Options, courts are to decide questions of at least Tier III arbi-
trability in both collective bargaining and private contractual contexts,
unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably" allocate that power to the
arbitrator.254 A court may not imply this "clear and unmistakable" intent
247. On the strategic use of concurring opinions, see generally Igor Kirman, Standing
Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995); Laura K. Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the
Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 777 (1990); and Richard B.
Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5
U. FLA. L. REV. 394 (1952).
248. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Warrior & Gulf was one of the "Steelworkers Trilogy" of
cases generally upholding the validity of arbitration in the collective bargaining context.
See also United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 583 (1960). These cases are often cited for the proposi-
tion that courts should apply a presumption of arbitrability when enforcing arbitration pro-
visions in collective bargaining agreements. See also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (establishing enforceability of collective bargaining agreements in federal
courts).
249. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 579-81.
250. Id. at 582
251. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
252. Id. at 651-52.
253. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79- 81 (1998) (holding that
a waiver of statutory rights must at least be clear and unmistakable); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (holding that federal law does not preempt capacity of
parties to choose law that will govern arbitration); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) (holding that the FAA's basic purpose is to "ensure judicial en-
forcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate").
254. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943-44.
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from an arbitration provision that is silent on the question, 255 nor may a
court impute such an intent from the conduct of the parties in participat-
ing in the arbitration over objection. 256 Acquiescence to the arbitration
of the "who decides" question must be "clear and unmistakable. '257
The Court has continued to extend this principle, most recently refus-
ing to find that an employment arbitration agreement bound the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as a third party to the contract
because the EEOC was never a party to the arbitration agreement. 258 In
so doing, the Court stressed that lower courts are to "look first to
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy
goals, to determine the scope of the agreement. '25 9
B. HOWSAM V. DEAN WI-TER REYNOLDS
The Court's 2002 term decision in Howsam built upon First Options
and continued to send strong signals about movement toward an actual
consent standard. While First Options clarifies the allocation of judicial
and arbitral roles and related presumptions with respect to Tier III ques-
tions, Howsam clarifies the definition of arbitrability by at least attempt-
ing to draw a clear line between questions of arbitrability that are to be
decided by courts, and those matters that bear on the decisional alloca-
tion between courts and arbitrators but are not questions of arbitrability.
This clarified an important question left open by First Options: whether
its refashioned arbitrability analysis included a place for what historically
had been called "procedural arbitrability." The answer, as we shall see,
was "yes, but not within the arbitrability analysis."
1. The Narrow Issue and Decision in Howsam
Howsam focused on whether courts or arbitrators were to decide
whether an investor's claim against a broker was timely filed under the
securities industry's so-called "six year" rule for filing such claims. It
arose out of an investor's lawsuit against a securities broker, which was
compelled to arbitration under a broad general arbitration provision in
the industry's standard customer contract. 260 Under the rule, "[n]o dis-
pute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for arbitration under this
Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giv-
255. Id. at 944.
256. First Options, 514 U.S. at 946.
257. See Rau, supra note 32, at 303.
258. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
259. Id. at 294.
260. As in other contexts, mandatory securities arbitration is controversial. Compare
Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration:
The Further Aggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 109 (1996)
(criticizing arbitration provisions in investor-broker contracts required for the opening of
accounts), with Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the
Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 185 (1996) (contending that mandatory se-
curities arbitration has helped stave off litigation costs).
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ing rise to the act or dispute, claim, or controversy. "261
The question that had deeply split the lower courts was whether the
"eligible for arbitration" language was more akin to a statute of limita-
tions, and therefore a procedural issue that traditionally would be de-
cided by the arbitrator, or whether it was a threshold jurisdictional
requirement that traditionally would be decided by a court. Five federal
circuits had drawn the analogy to a statute of limitations, 262 one way or
another, and five circuits had gone the other way, finding the language to
set a substantive jurisdictional requirement for judicial determination. 263
The Tenth Circuit in Howsam ruled that the eligibility determination
was to be made by the arbitrator, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed, on
an 8-0 vote. 264 Justice Breyer, continuing to establish himself as the
Court's leader on arbitration issues,265 again wrote the opinion for the
Court.
2 6 6
2. The Decision's Broader Doctrinal Significance
On its facts, Howsam was important to the securities industry because
it settled the question of whether the court or arbitrator was to decide the
six-year eligibility issue. 267 However, Howsam's broader doctrinal signifi-
cance can be found in both how the Court chose to reach its decision, and
in how the Court chose not to reach its decision, because both sets of
choices addressed questions that were left open by the First Options case.
3. The Rationale Accepted by the Court and its Significance
Breyer's opinion turned exclusively on what before First Options would
have been termed a procedural arbitrability issue: that the eligibility de-
termination was procedural and not substantive in nature. However, the
Court labeled this determination a "procedural question" that "falls
within the class of gateway procedural issues that do not present what our
261. NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10304 (2002) (formerly known as
NASD Code § 15) (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., Painewebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996); Painewebber Inc. v.
Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750 (5th
Cir. 1995); FSC See. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994); O'Neel v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1982).
263. Painewebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993); Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 474
(6th Cir. 1997); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992); Cogswell
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir 1996); Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
264. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recused herself from the case. Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 588, 593 (2002).
265. In addition to First Options and Howsam, Justice Breyer also wrote the majority
opinion in Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), which gives the broadest
possible construction to the term "commerce" in the FAA.
266. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 593.
267. See, e.g., Reed v. Mut. Serv. Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003);




cases have called "questions of arbitrability. 268
Breyer's opinion was grounded in the First Options analysis, particu-
larly its "strong pro-court presumption ' 269 that courts are to decide
"questions of arbitrability" to "avoid[ ] the risk of forcing parties to arbi-
trate a matter they may well not have agreed to arbitrate. '270 After ex-
pressing the Court's frustration with the malleability and ubiquity of the
term "arbitrability," 271 Breyer articulated a relatively specific definition
of "questions of arbitrability" that would be subject to what he called
"the interpretive rule of First Options. ' 272 This, Breyer said, was the
"narrow" set of questions in which "contracting parties would likely have
expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not
likely to have thought that they had agreed an arbitrator would do so,
and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court
avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well
not have agreed to arbitrate. '273
By contrast, Breyer also took care to delineate the questions that do
not fall within this "more limited scope" of arbitrability, and therefore
are to be decided by arbitrators rather than courts of law. These include
"'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its
final disposition," and "allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability. ''274 Because such claims are "an aspect of the controversy"
that called the arbitration provision into play, 275 Breyer said it is "reason-
able to infer" that the parties intended for the arbitrator to decide the
gateway issue.276
While this new "aspect of the controversy" test for determining proce-
dural arbitrability at least provides a framework for analyzing the gate-
way issue, its malleability unfortunately makes it most useful in the
clearest cases instead of the more difficult "close" calls, in which judicial
guidance would be most helpful. For this reason, one suspects Breyer
took the crucial move of justifying the inference by reference to party
expectations. In effect, the opinion says that when deciding closer cases
courts should align the decision maker with the institutional competence
of that decision maker to make the particular gateway decision, thus pro-
moting the efficiency goals that likely influenced the parties to choose
arbitration in the first instance. Applying this institutional competence
268. Id. at 592.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Said Breyer, "[l]inguistically speaking, one might call any potentially dispositive
gateway question a 'question of arbitrability,' for its answer will determine whether the




275. Id. at 593. For an example of a case applying the broad latitude for arbitral author-
ity for questions of scope under First Options and Howsam, see Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.





principle to the six-year rule, Breyer said the NASD arbitrators are "com-
paratively more expert about the meaning of their own rule, [and] are
comparatively better able to interpret and apply it.''277
The Court's decision to treat the six-year rule as a procedural matter
was significant for several reasons.
First, it resolved an important question left open in First Options:
whether in fact the Court would continue to recognize procedural arbi-
trability as a set of issues that would be resolved by the arbitrator rather
than the court. The Court's language in First Options regarding "arbi-
trability" was not nearly as nuanced as pre-First Options doctrine would
have commanded, 278 and a strong reading of First Options could plausibly
have led to the conclusion that procedural arbitrability questions would
be "arbitrability issues" in the new First Options regime. If so, they
would need to be resolved by courts, rather than arbitrators, unless the
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise. Under this view, the
courts would still have been required to interpret arbitration provisions
with reference to the presumption that "doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 279
While it seemed unlikely, and certainly undesirable, for the Court to
jettison the doctrine of procedural arbitrability, just how the doctrine
would fit within the First Options analysis was less obvious. Howsam an-
swered that question by recognizing procedural matters as issues that are
not "questions of arbitrability. '280 One may reasonably question whether
the Court's new nomenclature will engender more confusion than clarifi-
cation, especially since the principal case upon which the Court relied was
the seminal case defining procedural arbitrability, John Wiley & Sons.
But it settles the law to know both that the procedural arbitrability doc-
trine is still viable, and, perhaps more important, how it is to be treated
analytically in the post-First Options regime.
A second reason that the Court's treatment of the six-year rule as a
procedural issue rather than an arbitrability issue is significant is that it
underscores the Court's appreciation for restoring a sense of reality to the
law of arbitrability. Although the opinion does not make the point, one
does not have to read too far between the lines to see that the Court in
Howsam recognized that it was dealing with a situation in which both
parties acknowledged that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. Just
as it recognized in First Options the underlying reality that there simply
was not an arbitration provision in the work-out agreement over which
First Options was seeking to compel arbitration, the parties in Howsam
had clearly agreed to arbitrate at least some disputes-and indeed How-
sam selected the NASD's arbitration forum from among other possibili-
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (1983)).
280. Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 592-93. The Court's phrasing is so cumbersome as to give




ties.281 In Howsam there was no contention that the container contract
was non-existent (as in First Options), void ab initio as a matter of pol-
icy,282 or otherwise voidable at the election of the aggrieved party.
Rather, the only disagreement was over who was to decide the "eligibil-
ity" issue in this particular dispute-the Tier III issue decided in First
Options.283 As the Court has held repeatedly since Mitsubishi Motors,
and restated in First Options, such scope issues receive a presumption in
favor of arbitrability-a presumption in this case fortified by a recogni-
tion of the unique institutional competence of NASD arbitrators to re-
solve questions over the meaning of NASD rules.
Finally, the Court's decision to rely exclusively on the procedural non-
arbitrability analysis is important because Mrs. Howsam offered the
Court several other significant grounds for ruling in her favor that would
have addressed questions that remained unanswered after First Op-
tions-and the Court refused to accept all of them. Each of these issues
merits consideration.
4. Rationales Not Adopted by the Court
First Options has been justifiably criticized for failing to state just how
"clear and unmistakable" the waiver of the judicial access right needs to
be, and how such waiver is to be manifest.28 4 The petitioner in Howsam
asked the Court to clarify this requirement by holding that the "clear and
unmistakable" requirement was met by a broad arbitration clause, 28 5 or
that, alternatively, it was met by the combination of a broad arbitration
clause and supporting documents that incorporate the arbitration of arbi-
trability issues into the arbitration provision by reference. 286 Both ques-
tions were profoundly important to the future reach of what may be the
emerging First Options doctrine, and were the basis of the decision be-
low. 287 As a result, the Court's silence on both of these issues speaks
volumes-especially considering the efficiency interests that would miti-
gate against waiting until later cases to decide those questions.
281. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DisIurE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIA-
rION AND OTHER PROCESSES 237 (4th ed. 2003).
282. Ab initio is Latin for "from the beginning," BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 4 (7th ed.
1999), and refers to those cases in which the allegation is that while there was an agree-
ment that include an arbitration provision, it is one that the law will not enforce as a matter
of policy (i.e., because it deals with an illegal subject matter). For a discussion, see Joshua
R. Welsh, Has Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act Gone Too Far?: Enforcing Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Void Ab Initio Contracts, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 599-610 (2001).
283. Unlike the Kaplans, Howsam did not proceed to the arbitration under protest.
Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 591 ("The agreement also provides that Howsam can select the
arbitration forum. And Howsam chose arbitration before the NASD.").
284. See Guy Nelson, Note, The "Clear and Unmistakable" Standard: Why Arbitrators,
Not Courts Should Determine Whether a Securities Investor's Claim is Arbitrable, 54 VAN[I).
L. REV. 591, 594-95 (2001).
285. See Brief for the Petitioner at 32-37, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 123 S. Ct.
588 (2002) (No. 01-800).
286. Id. at 38-40.
287. It is a telling irony that the basis of the Supreme Court's decision, procedural arbi-
trability, was not argued in or decided by the Tenth Circuit.
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a. The "Broad Arbitration Clause" Argument
In addition to procedural arbitrability, a primary argument of Howsam
was that Dean Witter Reynolds' "clear and unmistakable" intent to waive
court access rights on the Tier III issue was manifest through the broad
arbitration clause submitting "all disputes arising under the contract" to
arbitration.288 In other words, the heart of the argument is that the intent
to arbitrate arbitrability is subsumed within the class of disputes covered
by the broad arbitration clause. This reflects an important question left
open by First Options. The Court's refusal to endorse this rationale when
given such an open opportunity strongly suggests that it is unwilling to do
so, and further supports the theory that the Court is moving toward an
actual consent model of arbitrability, one marked by an express and ex-
plicit waiver of court access rights.
Indeed, this is the second time in as many opportunities that the Court
has rejected the broad arbitration clause argument. First Options itself
was decided in the context of the Court's interpretation of a broad gen-
eral arbitration provision calling for "any controversy arising out of or
relating to this ... Agreement .. .[to be] submitted to and settled by
arbitration. ' 28 9 Despite the subtle invitation by counsel for First Options
at oral argument, the Court declined to find First Options' broad arbitra-
tion clause sufficient to establish "clear and unmistakable" intent to arbi-
trate the "who decides" question.290 Rather, the Court explicitly
established a contrary presumption: that the absence of clear and unmis-
takable waiver requires a court to presume that the parties did not intend
to arbitrate the "who decides" issue. 291 While the Court was not explicit
in its ruling that a broad general arbitration provision cannot satisfy the
"clear and unmistakable" waiver requirement, as a theoretical matter,
such an understanding would seem to follow a priori from the rule that
the Court did announce: that an arbitration provision's silence on arbi-
trability as a matter of law must be presumed to mean that the parties
intended for courts to decide such questions. The Court's refusal to
adopt, or even acknowledge, the "broad arbitration clause" argument
again in Howsam is entirely consistent with such an understanding.
This deliberate decision not to incorporate an endorsement of the
broad arbitration provision argument into its Howsam analysis has enor-
288. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 241, at 39-40. This inquiry may also be
viewed as a scope issue, the question thus being whether the enforceability of an arbitra-
tion provision itself may be deemed to fall within the scope of a broad arbitration provi-
sion. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 219.
290. "QUESTION: Are you saying that the clear and unmistakable standard doesn't
apply, or that when they go to the arbitrator and say, we don't think we belong before you
but we're ready to let you decide it, that that's a clear and unmistakable submission that
the arbitrators' decision will get only deferential review?
MR. [JAMES] HOLZHAUER: Exactly. The submission of the issue to arbitration is a
clear and unmistakable agreement to submit the issue to arbitration." See Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 240, at *20-21.
291. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
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mous significance, as amicus curiae participating in the case stressed to
the Court.292 As a practical matter, given the pervasiveness of such pro-
visions, the acceptance of this argument would have greatly constrained
the reach of the First Options ruling if the Court had second thoughts
about it. More theoretically, such a ruling would have reinforced the im-
plied consent theory of arbitrability that, among other things, supports
the separability doctrine. After all, the most obvious way to preserve
Prima Paint's allocation of the decision regarding the container contract
validity to the arbitrator under First Options is by an understanding that
would include the container contract issue as falling within the scope of a
broad arbitration clause, as a few courts to date have held.2 93 Such a
"broad arbitration clause" argument was plainly inconsistent with both
the facts and the theoretical foundation of First Options, and the Court's
second refusal to adopt it in as many opportunities should lay to rest any
claim to the argument's legitimacy, and discourage any efforts to resur-
rect it in the future.
b. The "Incorporation by Reference" Argument
The Court also refused to accept a related "implied consent" argument:
Howsam's contention, citing Mastruobono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.,294 that an extrinsic expression of intent to arbitrate arbitrability may
be incorporated by reference into a broad arbitration provision.295
Unlike the broad arbitration clause issue, this question was not consid-
ered in First Options, and the logic of the argument is essentially as fol-
lows: while the broad arbitration clause in the Dean Witter customer
contract mandates arbitration of all disputes, it gives Mrs. Howsam the
option to choose to have that arbitration conducted "before any self-reg-
ulatory organization or exchange of which Dean Witter is a member. '296
By selecting the NASD as her provider, Mrs. Howsam agreed to arbitrate
according to NASD rules, including the NASD Code of Arbitration Pro-
cedure. Rule 10304 of that Code provides that "[t]he arbitrators shall be
empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions
under this Code .... "297 Therefore, the incorporation argument con-
cludes, "[t]he arbitrators are . . . designated to interpret and apply
§¢ 10304, and in doing so, to determine what claims are eligible thereunder
for submission to arbitration. '298
As with the "broad arbitration clause" argument, the Court's unwill-
ingness to accept the incorporation argument is consistent with a move-
292. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and AARP in Support
of Neither Party at 15-18, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 588 (2002)
(No. 01-800).
293. See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
294. 514 U.S. 52 (1995), cited in Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 241, at 31-32.
295. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 241 at 39-40.
296. Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 591.
297. NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10324 (2002).
298. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 241, at 33.
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ment toward an actual consent theory because the purported
incorporated agreement to arbitrate arbitrability provides even less evi-
dence of a "clear and unmistakable intent" to waive judicial access than
may be found in a broad arbitration provision. After all, an incorporated
expression of intent is one step removed from the arbitration provision
itself, mere boilerplate referenced by more boilerplate. While such a pro-
cedure would clearly be more efficient for brokers and the courts, First
Options was quite clear in rejecting efficiency rationales in favor of what
appears to be a more specific case-by-case analysis "to ensure that com-
mercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced accord-
ing to their terms. ' 299 The Court's refusal to acknowledge the argument
is consistent with that repudiation.
Like the "broad arbitration clause" argument, the "incorporation" ar-
gument has practical significance outside of the securities context. One
common and sensible response to First Options by arbitration service
providers has been to incorporate language into their rules expressly allo-
cating the arbitrability decision to the arbitrators. For example, the
American Arbitration Association has amended its commercial rules to
provide that the arbitrator "shall have the power to rule on his or her
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence,
scope or validity of the arbitration agreement. '300 The purpose of this
amendment, particularly its inclusion of the term "scope," is to "further
clarif[y] the arbitrator's power to rule on any challenge to jurisdiction." 301
The fact that the Court refused even to acknowledge this argument
suggests little support within the Court for such a strategy, even though
some lower courts have been more receptive. 302 Indeed, if the Court con-
tinues moving toward an actual consent theory of arbitrability, such strat-
egies for accommodating First Options should be unavailing. The mere
addition of a clause referencing extrinsic standards-including the intent
to arbitrate arbitrability-surely would give little comfort to courts that
require "clear and unmistakable" evidence of such waiver because they
are "understandably" concerned about "forc[ing] unwilling parties to ar-
bitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbi-
trator, would decide." 303
299. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947.
300. Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, R. 8(a) (amended 1999). It is also in the process of changing its rules for other types
of arbitration in the same way. Telephone interview with Frank T. Zotto, Vice President-
Case Management, American Arbitration Association (June 14, 2002).
301. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n Commercial Arbitration Rules Subcomm., Am. Arbi-
tration Ass'n, Commentary on the Revisions to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, in ADR CURRENTS (Dec. 1998).
302. Two district courts have recently upheld the Rule 8 approach as a sufficiently
"clear and unmistakable" waiver of intent to arbitrate arbitrability. Sleeper Farms v. Ag-
way, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002); Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal
& Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 677, 685 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
303. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
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C. SOME OPEN QUESTIONS AFTER FIRST OPTIONS AND HOWSAM
In addition to providing support for the proposition that the Court may
be moving toward an actual consent theory of arbitrability, the foregoing
discussion demonstrates how the Court's decision in Howsam appears to
have resolved three questions left open by First Options. The Court di-
rectly settled the continued legitimacy and analytical place of procedural
arbitrability by using this as the exclusive basis for its decision, finding
procedural matters not to be arbitrability issues at all. Similarly, the
Court's refusal to incorporate into its analysis the "broad arbitration
clause" and the "incorporation by reference" argument should relegate
those claims to the dustbin of other discredited arguments.
There are, however, at least three other major arbitrability issues raised
by the Court's decision in First Options that remain open after Howsam.
The first is whether the "clear and unmistakable" requirement for waiver
of court access rights on the Tier III "who decides" question also applies
to Tier II questions over whether there was in fact an agreement to arbi-
trate. The second is the impact of First Options and Howsam on the doc-
trine of competence-competence. Finally, the third question is what impact
First Options and Howsam have on the doctrine of separability.
1. Does "Clear and Umistakable" Apply to First Options Tier II
Issues?
The bulk of the Court's work in First Options addressed an issue relat-
ing to the first of these questions-whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate, in particular, the more arcane issue of "who decides" whether
there is an agreement to arbitrate, which the Court referred to as the
"third type of disagreement" in First Options.3 04 The Court in First Op-
tions tells us to apply a "clear and unmistakable" test to this third type of
disagreement, but the opinion is ambiguous on whether the "clear and
unmistakable" standard also applies to Tier II disagreements-the more
common question on the merits of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
the dispute. In other words, if the parties have left the decision on this
question to the court (by virtue of silence on the Tier III question), by
what standard is a court supposed to determine if the parties have agreed
to arbitrate a dispute? "Clear and unmistakable," as with Tier III ques-
tions? A lower standard? Moreover, how much evidence, and what kind
of evidence, may a trial court look at in making this determination?
Under the First Options regime, which way should the presumption fall?
Is this a scope issue, which would lead to a presumption favoring arbitra-
tion of the issue? Or is it a validity question, which would lead to a pre-
sumption of judicial resolution?
Certainly it can be argued either way, and in this regard, the Court's
decision in Howsam provides some guidance by referring to institutional
competence as a likely source of party expectations with regard to ques-
304. Id. at 942.
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tions of arbitrability. Moreover, as a matter of policy, if the Court's con-
cern is party consent to arbitration, to ensure that parties are not
compelled to arbitrate issues that they have not submitted to arbitra-
tion,305 there seems to be little reason to apply a lesser standard of proof
to the merits of the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
than is applied to the predicate question of "who decides" that question.
On the other hand, it can be argued that this second-level question is
merely one of interpreting an otherwise enforceable contract, thus calling
for the lesser standard of proof First Options requires for matters of
scope.30 6 While the issue might take some percolation in the lower
courts, it is a question the Supreme Court will likely need to decide as it
develops the First Options regime.
2. What are the Implications for Competence-Competence?
First Options also leaves open the question of competence-competence,
in particular whether arbitrators have the authority to decide the scope of
their own jurisdiction. First Options cuts new ground on this dimension
by clearly permitting arbitrators to exercise this power "when the parties
[have] submitted that matter to arbitration. '30 7 Significantly, too, the
Court appears to have allocated that decision to arbitrators as an initial
matter in these situations, instructing lower courts that they "must defer
to an arbitrator's arbitrability decision" when the parties have clearly and
unmistakably entrusted it to arbitrators. 308 It is this "potentially trouble-
some" aspect of the case that some arbitration scholars have treated as
the most doctrinally significant part of the First Options opinion in a
lively debate on the issue of whether arbitrability should be a mandatory
or default rule-that is, whether parties should be able to waive the statu-
tory power of the courts to decide the arbitrability question-and the de-
gree to which arbitrators should be able to determine the scope of their
own jurisdiction. 309 While the Court's resolution of this issue has been
controversial, it has in any event been decided. The open question raised
by First Options, however, is whether, and the degree to which, arbitra-
tors have this power in the absence of specific contractual authorization.
That is, whether arbitrators have the inherent power-the competence-
competence-to determine the scope of their jurisdiction, including the
power to invalidate the contract granting them arbitral authority. How-
sam indicates that they do.
305. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
306. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
307. Id. at 943.
308. Id.
309. See Park, supra note 77 (raising the question); Tom Carbonneau, A Comment
Upon Professor Park's Analysis of the Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan, INT'L ARB. REP.,
Nov. 1996, at 18 (arguing that arbitrability is a mandatory rule and may not be waived by
party agreement); Alan Scott Rau, Arbitration as Contract: One More Word About First
Options v. Kaplan, INT'L ARB. REP., Mar. 1997, at 21 (arguing that arbitrability is a default
rule and may be waived by party agreement); Tom Carbonneau, Le Tournoi of Academic
Commentary on Kaplan: A Reply to Professor Rau, INT'L ARB. REP., Apr. 1997, at 35.
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Take, for instance, the illustrative example offered in Part II, in which
the purchaser of real estate attempts to void a contract on the basis of
fraud or material misrepresentation that there are no problems with the
exterior brick veneer.310 It is clear under First Options that the arbitrator
would have the authority to invalidate the container contract if the arbi-
tration provision specifically granted the arbitrator the power to decide
that question. However, it is less clear under First Options whether the
arbitrator would have such authority pursuant to a broad general arbitra-
tion provision that did not include such express authority. Howsam, how-
ever, recognizes that certain aspects of arbitral jurisdiction may be
decided by the arbitrator-assuming there is a valid arbitration provision
(such matter to be determined by a court unless the parties otherwise
agree). As Howsam itself demonstrates, an arbitator's authority to de-
cide whether a matter is eligible for jurisdiction before the arbitrator nec-
essarily implies that the arbitrator has the jurisdictional autonomy to
make that determination. This is the essence of competence-competence,
and, as such, specific incorporation of the doctrine into the post-First Op-
tions law of arbitrability would appear to be a mere formality, ripe for
easy resolution in a future case.
3. The Doctrine of Separability
The last open question after First Options and Howsam is the future of
the doctrine of separability. As discussed in the next section, the demise
of separability seems appropriate as a matter of theory, doctrine, and
practicality.
V. TAKING FIRST OPTIONS SERIOUSLY: THE DEMISE
OF SEPARABILITY
Howsam seems to support the argument that the Court is rethinking,
clarifying, and perhaps simplifying the law of arbitrability. The further it
moves along such a path toward actual consent to arbitration, the clearer
it becomes how First Options "sits uneasily alongside" of Prima Paint.3 11
In this part, I describe the nature of the tension between these cases, how
the lower courts have responded to it, and the impact of Howsam.
A. THE TENSION BETWEEN FIRST OPTIONS AND PRIMA PAINT
1. Generational Friction
As we have seen, Prima Paint and First Options are a generation
apart. 312 Prima Paint was decided at a time when the Supreme Court re-
alized that it would take more than legislation to change distrustful judi-
310. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
311. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2002) (Eas-
terbrook, J.) (decided on other grounds).
312. See Stempel, supra note 55, at 310-24 (comparing old and new arbitration); supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
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cial attitudes regarding arbitration. First Options was decided a quarter
of a century later, after the judicial mind had been turned, at least as a
general matter,31 3 and after experience with "new" arbitration began to
identify some of its frailties (including the potential for abuse in situations
of power imbalance,314 problems of repeat player effects,315 and personal
and social costs of these problems in terms of public perceptions of the
law316). Therefore, while the underlying sentiment of Prima Paint may
have been a call to promote arbitration by enhancing the power of arbi-
trators, that sentiment in First Options appears to have been to return the
judicial pendulum to the FAA's statutory roots in contract and actual as-
sent. 317 Indeed, this more moderated approach toward arbitration has
generally characterized the Court's decisions in the steady flow of opin-
ions since First Options.318
2. Jurisprudential Differences
The generational differences between the First Options and Prima
Paint decision, and the ongoing struggle over the fundamental tension,
underscore the significance of the opposing analytical foundations sup-
porting the two cases. As we have seen, Prima Paint was erected on a
pedestal of implied consent to arbitration.31 9 First Options explicitly re-
jects implied consent and its underlying rationale of efficiency, and in-
stead insists on a "clear and unmistakable" intent to arbitrate in the
contract at issue. 320 Howsam provides further evidence that the Court is
moving toward a posture of some form of actual consent. While a more
313. Judicial attitudes are always subject to the fundamental tension in individual cases.
See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
314. See sources cited supra note 16.
315. See sources cited supra note 17. For a general discussion of advantages enjoyed by
repeat players in the civil litigation context, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REV. 95 (1974).
For a summary of empirical studies in the employment context, see Lisa B. Bingham, Self-
Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 873, 889-902 (2002) and studies cited therein (documenting "repeat player effect" but
noting there can be many explanations for the phenomenon). For a general discussion in
the ADR context, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Altec-
native Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 19, 20
(1999). For arguments applying repeat player as a basis for rejecting the enforcement of
executory arbitration agreements in the non-union employment context, see Sarah Ru-
dolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbi-
tration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996).
316. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 633-41.
317. See Reuben, supra note 50.
318. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. 754
(2002) (rejecting arguments that an arbitration agreement bars the EEOC from pursuing
victim-specific judicial relief on behalf of an employee); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Ran-
dolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (leaving open the possibility that the imposition of forum fees
may be sufficient to invalidate an arbitration agreement); Wright v. Universal Mar. Servs.
Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (refusing to compel arbitration of an ADA claim under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement because longshoreman's waiver of federal forum was not "clear
and unmistakable").
319. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.320. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943; see supra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
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explicit statement from the Court would be helpful, lower courts should
be mindful of this trajectory and proceed accordingly.
3. Technical Inconsistency
This generational and jurisprudential inconsistency between First Op-
tions and Prima Paint is felt at the level of formal positive law.
Under First Options and Howsam, courts, not arbitrators, decide ques-
tions of at least Tier III arbitrability, unless the parties "clearly and un-
mistakably" give this power to the arbitrator. 321 If, however, the
arbitration provision is included in a larger contract, and the dispute is
about the validity of that larger contract, Prima Paint, on the other hand,
requires courts to presume that the parties have agreed to arbitrate
merely by entering into the larger contract, regardless of its validity. The
tension seems palpable.
In an often brilliant work, Professor Alan Rau offers what may be
respected as the classic defense of Prima Paint, suggesting that "[tihere is
not the slightest conflict between Kaplan and Prima Paint as properly
understood. '322 Both cases simply require the validity of the arbitration
provision to be decided by a court when the challenge is directed at that
provision. 323 Because First Options dealt only with the Tier III "who de-
cides" question, it merely made explicit a rule of law that Rau says had
always been assumed to be true, and which was not even challenged in
Prima Paint:324 courts decide questions of arbitrability of agreements to
arbitrate.
By contrast, Rau asserts that Prima Paint is a "second level" or Tier II
question, which he reframes as "who is actually to decide the merits of
the fraudulent inducement claim?" 32 5 As "properly understood, ' 326
Prima Paint is merely a default rule case, establishing the default rule that
arbitrators, rather than courts, are to decide whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a dispute regarding the container contract unless the parties
agree otherwise. 327 Rau recognizes that the default rule set by the Prima
321. Howsam defines such questions in terms of "the kind of narrow circumstance
where the contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the gate-
way matter, where they are not likely to have thought they had agreed that an arbitrator
would do so, and consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids
the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to
arbitrate." Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 592.
322. See Rau, supra note 32, at 331.
323. Again, if this were all that First Options was about, one would have to wonder why
the Court bothered to grant review when it could have affirmed the appellate ruling by
simply denying review. See supra note 225.
324. Rau, supra note 32, at 339.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 336. Rau's discussion here is unclear. The Court framed the second-level
question in terms of "whether they agreed to arbitrate the merits." First Options, 514 U.S.
at 942. However, Rau frames it as "who is actually to decide the merits of the fraudulent
inducement claim," which seems to reflect the Tier III disagreement over "who decides"
the Tier II question rather than the decision on the arbitrability of the merits. Rau, supra
note 32, at 339 (emphasis added).
327. Rau, supra note 32, at 339.
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Paint court is a judicial rather than legislative policy choice that "like any
background rule [is] made largely on the basis of functional considera-
tions. '32 8 But he says this judicial policy choice is justified to "overcome
the conceptual horror of an arbitral decision of contract invalidity that
'calls into question the validity of the arbitration clause from which [the
arbitrators] derive their power"' and to recognize the "probable compe-
tence of the arbitrators, by presuming that they have been entrusted by
the parties with the power to make a virtually non-reviewable decision on
the issue of validity." 3
29
While such "functional considerations" may have been a motivating
factor in Prima Paint when it was drafted, they clearly did not animate the
policy choice that the Supreme Court in fact made a generation later in
First Options. To the contrary, First Options expressly rejected such a
"functional" choice supporting broad arbitral power to decide jurisdiction
in favor of the opposite policy choice: that courts are to look beyond effi-
ciency interests and decide on a case-by-case basis whether the parties
have agreed to arbitrate Tier III questions, unless the parties have
"clearly and unmistakably" allocated that decision to the arbitrator. 330
Rau is undoubtedly correct in his conclusion that both cases insist on
judicial resolution of the Tier III "who decides" arbitrability issue-a
point well worth clarifying given the conceptual confusion that has
shrouded arbitrability in general. That is not the rub between the cases,
however. Rather, the rub is over who decides whether the container con-
tract itself is valid-or, put in the rubric of First Options: the Tier III
question of who decides the Tier II dispute over whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate the validity of the container contract.
Prima Paint, of course, allocates that decision to the arbitrator as a
matter of default, under a theory of implied consent to arbitrate. 33' First
Options does not specifically address the issue of the applicability of its
principles to the arbitrability of container contracts, speaking only to
arbitrability in general, without regard to the nuanced distinctions that
have so hindered visibility within this Serbonian bog of law. However, if
First Options is to be taken seriously, particularly in light of Howsam,
then the validity of the container contract would have to be allocated to
the courts unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably" agreed otherwise
because First Options sets the default on the "who decides" question with
the courts, not the arbitrators.
Because the Court did not address this point of friction between First
Options and Prima Paint directly, it remains open and in need of judicial
resolution. However, the Court's unanimous opinions in both First Op-
tions and Howsam were grounded in the need for the law to support the
328. Id.
329. Id. at 341.
330. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947.
331. See Rau, supra note 32, at 335-38.
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parties' expectations332 and to prevent the possibility that a court "might
too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably
would have thought a judge, and not an arbitrator would decide. 333
Such reasoning leads logically only to one conclusion: that courts should
decide the validity of the container contracts, unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably agree to allocate that function to the arbitrator. In-
deed, it borders on the absurd to suggest that a court troubled by such
concerns would endorse a rule compelling into arbitration a party to a
legally unenforceable contract merely because of the presence of an arbi-
tration provision in the otherwise unenforceable contract.
B. How THE LOWER COURTs HAVE RESPONDED TO THE TENSION
The lower courts are only beginning to meaningfully address the ten-
sion between First Options and Prima Paint. While several have noted
it,334 only two appellate courts-one federal and one state-have given
the tension principled analysis: the Fourth Circuit in Gregory v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane,335 and the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex Parte Helen
Perry.336
Interestingly, both cases took very different routes to the very similar
result of applying First Options. In Gregory, the Fourth Circuit took a
broad view of First Options, reversing a district court decision applying
Prima Paint to a securities brokerage contract containing an arbitration
clause because the district court "had not adequately considered the 'first
principle' of arbitration law" relied upon in First Options, that courts are
to decide arbitrability absent the "clear and unmistakable" agreement of
the parties.337 In Perry, however, the Alabama Supreme Court acknowl-
edged it was taking a narrower view of First Options, all but reversing a
prior attempt to square First Options and Prima Paint.338 Yet in both
cases, the courts ended up deciding the arbitrability issues, as First Op-
tions would require, because the facts in both cases were claims that the
container contracts had not been properly signed, and therefore were
void ab initio-that is to say, never existed in the first place. 339 As noted
earlier,3411 this voidness rationale is one that some courts historically have
used to limit Prima Paint and retain jurisdiction over a contract with an
arbitration clause, by holding that courts are to decide the arbitrability of
332. See Howsa, 123 S. Ct. at 592.
333. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945: see supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Cular v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 550, 555 n.4 (1997) (citing
several Southern District of New York district court cases "questioning the continued va-
lidity" of Prima Paint in light of First Options).
335. 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished).
336. 744 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 1999).
337. Gregory, 188 F.3d at 501.
338. Perry, 744 So. 2d at 864 (criticizing its earlier decision in Allstar Homes, Inc. v.
Waters, 711 So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1997) for "expanding too broadly the rationale of the Su-
preme Court in First Options").
339. Also taking this approach is Campaniello Imports Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.P.A., No.
95 Civ 7685 (RPP), 1996 WL 437907, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1996).
340. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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container contracts that are claimed to be void, rather than merely
voidable. 34 1
Indeed, in its attempt to square the two cases, the Alabama Supreme
Court went so far as to suggest that First Options is limited to the void
contract context,342 because the Kaplans had claimed in First Options
that they were not subject to arbitration because they had not signed an
agreement to arbitrate First Options' claims against them personally.
However, given the Court's conceptualization of the issues in First Op-
tions, such an approach would essentially limit First Options to its facts,
despite the manner in which that analysis is applied in First Options it-
self,343 and without regard to the analytical shift in First Options that
Howsam seems to confirm. 344 As the Fourth Circuit recognized in Perry,
addressing a slightly different issue, "Kaplan cannot be limited to the fac-
tual circumstance with which the court was faced in that case. The clear
import of the language and logic in Kaplan is that, when given the oppor-
tunity, a district court should decide the threshold arbitrability issue
before sending the case to an arbitration panel. '345
To date, Gregory and Perry are the only meaningful judicial efforts to
grapple with the tension between First Options and Prima Paint. The re-
mainder of the cases recognizing it have greeted the tension with varying
forms of aversion, and varying levels of doctrinal integrity.
Some courts have attempted to get around the problem by resorting to
the "broad arbitration clause" argument, holding that the "clear and un-
mistakable" intent to arbitrate the "who decides" question may be in-
ferred from a broad general arbitration provision. 346 While this approach
has the elegance of simplicity, efficiency, and at least some analytical
principle, with Howsam it has now been rejected by the Supreme Court
twice, and other courts have properly rejected this rationale.347
341. See, e.g., Jolley v. Welch, 904 F.2d 988, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1050 (1991); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140
(9th Cir. 1991): Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (1lth Cir.
1992).
342. Ironically, this is the same argument made frequently by courts seeking to limit
Prima Paint. See, e.g., supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 237-46 and accompanying text.
344. The Alabama Supreme Court's approach still would not resolve the tension be-
tween Prima Paint and First Options because that tension arises when there is an allegation
that the container contract is voidable because of the availability of an affirmative defense
to its enforcement, as with the consulting contract in Prima Paint, despite the validity of the
arbitration provision.
345. Gregory, 188 F.3d at 501 n.7.
346. See, e.g., Bell v. Cendant Corp., 293 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying Connecticut
law); Painewebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1200 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying New York
law); Ex parte Helen Perry, 744 So. 2d 859, 864 (Ala. 1999): Cummings & Lockwood, P.C.
v. Simses, No. CIV. 301CV422PCD, 2001 WL 789313, at *3 (D. Conn. July 5, 2001) (ignor-
ing and misapplying First Options); Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189
(S.D. Calif. 2001) (same); Kamaya Co., Ltd. v. Am. Prop. Consultants, Ltd., 959 P.2d 1140,
1145-46 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (noting questions of other courts about continued validity
of Prima Paint).
347. See, e.g., Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a contract that violates usury law cannot be referred to arbitration, reversing
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Other judicial approaches to results that support the continued vitality
of Prima Paint separability are even less principled. For example, some
courts have cited First Options, but applied Prima Paint, with no discus-
sion of the tension between them, much less discussion of the reason it
was choosing Prima Paint or First Options.348 A variation of this ap-
proach has been to acknowledge the tension between the cases, but to
summarily reject without analysis the claim that First Options overruled
Prima Paint.349 More commonly, courts have either simply ignored First
Options and applied Prima Paint, or have decided the cases on other
grounds. 35°1 Finally, there are cases, like Perry and Gregory, that have
cited Prima Paint, but have applied First Options in fact by deciding the
arbitrability issue themselves. 35'
C. THE DEMISE OF SEPARABILITY
The Court's continued apparent momentum toward actual consent in
Howsam only emphasizes the tension between First Options and Prima
Paint. However, resolution will come only when the Court addresses the
question squarely and revisits the separability doctrine. When it does, the
Court should repudiate separability, and make clear that the validity of
an arbitration provision in a container contract is contingent upon the
validity of the container contract itself, and that courts are to decide that
issue. Significantly, as we shall see, this need not constitute a formal
overruling of Prima Paint. Rather, a modernization of Prima Paint would
lower court referral that relied on Prima Paint); Frizzell Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg, 9
S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tenn. 1999) (effectively applying First Options rather than Prina Paint anal-
ysis in holding that courts decide questions of contract formation directed at container
contract); Duryee v. PIE Mut. Ins. Co., No. 98AP-1255, 98AP-1256, 1999 WL 744341
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1999) (citing First Options as support for limiting Prima Paint to
voidable contracts); Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., 942 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(questioning continued validity of Prima Paint in light of First Options and deciding fraud
issue directed at container contract); Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc. 897 F. Supp. 100, 106 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). Still, the issue remains theoretically open.
348. See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1999);
Brown v. Miguens, No. 02 Civ.5278 JSM, 2003 WL 1090304 (S.D.N.Y. March I1, 2003);
Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Bosinger v. Phil-
lips Plastics Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Capitol Vial, Inc. v. Weber
Scientific, 966 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Miner Enters., Inc. v. Adidas AG, No.
95 C 1872, 1995 WL 708570 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 1995); Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906
F. Supp. 819, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
349. See, e.g., Wright v. SFX Entm't Inc., No. 00 CIV 5354 SAS, 2001 WL 103433, at *4
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2001) (clearly overstating circuit precedent).
350. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir.
2002) (Easterbrook, J.); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002).
351. See, e.g., Montrose v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., CIV.A. 5:00-0434, 2000 WL
33775396 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 20, 2000); Audio Video Ctr., Inc. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 84
F. Supp. 2d 624, 626-28 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that fraud in execution of the contract,
including the arbitration provision, must be decided by court); Cowen v. Tecnoconsultant
Holdings Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 3748 (BSJ), 1996 WL 391884, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1996)




recognize its core principle of arbitral authority, or competence-compe-
tence while shedding its controversial and overbroad husk of separability.
1. Why Separability Should be Repudiated
As we have seen, separability is not compelled by the traditional rules
of statutory interpretation, 352 the legislative history of the FAA,353 nor
the substantive law of contracts.3 54 Rather, as Professor Rau has ob-
served, separability is merely a judicial policy choice that is "made largely
on the basis of functional considerations. '355 As Professor Ian MacNeil
has also argued,35 6 this judicial policy choice could have gone the other
way: "Nothing would have prevented the Court in Prima Paint from hold-
ing that the making of an arbitration clause is in issue whenever the mak-
ing of the agreement containing it is in issue. '357
With the benefit of nearly thirty-five years of experience with separa-
bility, the rise of the "new arbitration," and the Court's own apparent
movement toward actual consent to arbitrability, the Court should revisit
that policy choice and restore the policy choice made by Congress in 1925
by repudiating separability, returning to the courts all arbitrability ques-
tions, as defined in Howsam, that are not "clearly and unmistakably"
given to arbitrators by the parties.
In considering whether to overrule a rule of law, which is farther than
the Court need go in revisiting Prima Paint, the Court typically considers
such pragmatic factors as whether it has proven unworkable, the degree
to which reversal of the rule would create hardship of upset settled expec-
tations, the degree to which the rule is merely a remnant of otherwise
abandoned doctrine, and the degree to which its prior justification has
been vitiated by a change in the facts surrounding the rule at issue.358
These standards counsel in favor of repudiating separability, while retain-
ing Prima Paint's core notion of arbitral autonomy.
a. Unworkability
The enormous confusion and uncertainty over the scope and applica-
tion of separability in the state and federal courts bears testament to the
doctrinal unworkability of separability. 359 It operates at a level of ab-
straction and "functional consideration 3611 that is far removed from the
daily experiences of contracting parties, as well as the reasonable expec-
tations of those parties that the Supreme Court emphasized in Howsam
352. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
355. Rau, supra note 32, at 339.
356. Professor Rau also acknowledges that the Court could have reached a different
result, but supports its ruling on separability. Id. at 336-38.
357. MacNeil, supra note 27, at 15.2 n.13.
358. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55
(1992) and cases cited therein.
359. See supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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are the touchstone of the gateway arbitrability determination. 36 1 As
such, in addition to placing decisional authority at the lowest level of in-
stitutional competence, separability can undermine public confidence in
the rule of law by failing to meet party expectations with respect to hav-
ing their "day in court" for a decision on the merits of their legal dis-
pute. 362 If a goal in law is to provide clear and stable guidance so that
parties may properly order their affairs, 3 63 the judicially created rule of
separability fails miserably.
b. Changed Circumstances
Separability is a vestige of an era of law that has long passed, when
judicial hostility toward agreements to arbitrate continued to endure de-
spite the legislative reversal of the ouster doctrine and when "old" arbi-
tration was just beginning to expand beyond its traditional home in
collective bargaining. 364 It was important for the Supreme Court to send
a strong message to the lower courts about the legitimacy of the FAA and
the need for the lower courts to respect and enforce the statute's obliga-
tion to enforce arbitration provisions according to their terms.36 5
That era of arbitration has long given way to the "new" arbitration.366
While the fundamental tension can still be seen in the reluctance to en-
force arbitration provisions in egregious individual cases, the courts no
longer operate under a sense of institutionalized distrust of arbitration.
To the contrary, the more common criticism of the courts is that they
have been too supportive of arbitration, 367 although that mood too seems
to be passing. Even then, however, courts are learning and coming to
understand the potential for abuses as they confront the thorny issues
arising from abusive arbitration provisions that implicate the most funda-
mental of legal rights. While separability and its principle of implied con-
sent may have been justified at the time Prima Paint was decided in light
of Wilko and as a demonstration of judicial support for the FAA, it is no
longer necessary or appropriate given the change in judicial attitudes and
the robust societal support for voluntary arbitration. 368 A requirement of
actual assent to arbitrability is far more appropriate in today's sophisti-
cated times, as the Court's opinions in First Options and Howsam clearly
361. Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 593.
362. See supra notes 144-45, 160-67 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 157 (1964) (arguing for an in-
strumental understanding of the rule of law). But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
235-40 (1971) (arguing that law should promote the liberty of citizens).
364. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
365. For a discussion of judicial reluctance to enforce the FAA, see Reuben, supra note
2, at 601 and cases cited therein.
366. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 46: Sternlight, supra note 47.
368. Such support may be seen in the many state and federal court ADR programs. See
supra notes 6-7. Moreover, approximately 4,000 businesses have signed the CPR Corporate
Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation (the corporate "Pledge"), under which they




reflect. A remnant of that former time, separability has outlived its
usefulness.
c. No Hardship in Repudiation of Separability
As fundamentally a functional housekeeping rule for allocating deci-
sional authority, it is difficult to see how parties might be inclined to rely
on the doctrine of separability in ordering their private contractual af-
fairs-at least in a way that is normatively desirable. 369 Therefore a judi-
cial decision repudiating separability should hardly be disruptive of
settled expectations. To the contrary, given the confused state of the pos-
itive law, one might reasonably question whether any contemporary reli-
ance upon separability exists, much less is justified.
The only potential hardship that would be suffered by repudiation of
separability is in judicial economy, and, as the Supreme Court clearly
stated in First Options, this is an illegitimate basis for judicial policy with
regard to arbitrability. "After all, the basic objective in this area is not to
resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the par-
ties' wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like
other contracts, "'are enforced according to their terms, and according to
the intentions of the parties. '370
2. Whither Prima Paint: Toward an American Competence-Competence
Significantly, the repudiation of separability need not, and should not,
constitute a formal overruling of Prima Paint. Rather, it should come in
the form of a reinterpretation, or evolved understanding, of Prima Paint's
core principle of arbitral authority. As Professors Alan Rau and William
Park have suggested, the most significant virtue of this aspect of Prima
Paint is that it avoids, in Rau's words, "the conceptual horror of an arbi-
tral decision of contract invalidity that calls into question the validity of
the arbitration clause from which [the arbitrators] derive their power."'37 1
Rau and Park are in my view correct about the need for American law to
accommodate some form of competence-competence, and that it is this
principle that lies at the legitimate core of Prima Paint's rule of separabil-
ity. If separability is viewed as the remedy for this problem, however, the
remedy is overbroad, no matter how well-intended. An arbitrator does
not need to have the exclusive power to decide the validity of a container
contract, nor even the first power to decide its validity,372 in order to have
enough power to avoid this "conceptual horror." Rather, an arbitrator
simply needs to have the actual power to make such a ruling if and when
369. One can always imagine an "evil-doer" intending to defraud, swindle, or otherwise
hoodwink another relying on separability as yet another barrier to ultimate accountability
to the rule of law. The law should hardly support such a result.
370. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947 (citations omitted).
371. Rau, supra note 32, at 340.
372. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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appropriate, and it is this understanding of Prima Paint that can and
should survive the ultimate repudiation of separability.
Clearly, more consideration than is appropriate here should be given to
the question of how to define and implement an American doctrine of
competence-competence, in light of the unique characteristics of our law
and culture, as well as the dearth of international experience in dealing
with these questions. However, such an understanding preserves the core
concern of Prima Paint, sheds its obsolescent husk of separability, and
brings Prima Paint into full alignment with First Options and Howsam,
the plain language and legislative intent of the FAA, the reasonable ex-
pectations of the contracting parties today, and indeed, international
norms regarding arbitral authority. 373 Under such an interpretation, arbi-
trators have the authority to decide the validity of container contracts-
as long as they are acting pursuant to a grant of authority that provides
"clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate that
issue, the validity of which would be decided if necessary by a court of
law.
Admittedly, such an understanding introduces an interesting anomaly:
the prospect of a court of law determining that the container contract is
valid, thus enforcing the arbitration provision contained therein, only to
have the arbitrator decide the container contract is invalid and therefore
unenforceable. 374 This is no cause for concern, however. To the contrary,
it is a possibility for an arbitral result that is precisely what the parties in
fact bargained for in deciding to arbitrate rather than adjudicate in court.
Judicial decision making and arbitral decision making proceed under dif-
ferent standards, 375 and it is not difficult to see how decision making that
is constrained by the rule of law-evidentiary law, procedural law, as well
as substantive law-could lead to, even compel, a different result than a
decision made in a process that is unfettered by such limitations. It is
impossible to say in the abstract which decision-making process is
"fairer"-as in fact, either could be "fairer" than the other, depending
upon the circumstances. But this trade-off in legal standards for other
process virtues is precisely what the parties' choice of adjudication before
an arbitrator or a court of law is all about-and why it is so important
that consent to such choice be actual rather than implied.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly a half century ago, at the early dawn of the modern ADR
movement, the U.S. Supreme Court created a rule of separability in
Prima Paint, instructing courts to presume that parties intended to arbi-
trate the validity of contracts with arbitration provisions when the chal-
lenge to those contracts is not directed exclusively at the arbitration
clause, and laying a foundation for an implied consent theory of arbi-
373. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 104, at 515-16.
374. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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trability. From a policy perspective, Prima Paint's goals of promoting ar-
bitration and securing the jurisdiction of the arbitrator were laudable. But
they come at the high cost of precluding judicial access for many parties
seeking to have a court, rather than an arbitrator, decide whether a con-
tract in which they have purportedly entered is enforceable as a matter of
contract law.
More recently, the Court appears to be moving toward a different ap-
proach; one emphasizing actual rather than implied consent, by insisting
in First Options and Howsam that questions about whether parties have
agreed to arbitrate are to be decided by courts, unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably waive that right. The tension between these two cases
is palpable, and calls for a determination by the Supreme Court as to
which will prevail. The better view, the view supported by the text and
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act, the view that enhances
rather than diminishes rule of law values, the view that appears to be
supported by all nine members of the current U.S. Supreme Court, is that
First Options should prevail. Carefully implemented to preserve arbitral
competence-competence, such a development would simplify and clarify
this unnecessarily complicated area of law, assure the jurisdictional au-
tonomy of arbitrators, fulfill rather than defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of parties in arbitration, return the doctrine to the clear legislative
intent of the FAA, and, in the end, restore access to justice for contracts
with arbitration clauses.
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